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Modern-Day Monitorships
Veronica Roott
When a sexual abuse scandal rocked Penn State, when Apple was found to
have engaged in anticompetitive behavior, and when servicers like Bank of
America improperly foreclosed upon hundreds of thousands of homeowners,
each organization entered into a "Modern-Day Monitorship. " Modern-day
monitorships are utilized in an array of contexts to assist in widely varying re-
mediation efforts. This is because they provide outsiders with a unique source of
information about the efficacy of the tarnished organization 's efforts to resolve
misconduct. Yet, despite their use in high profile and serious matters of organi-
zational wrongdoing, they are not an outgrowth of careful study and deliberate
planning. Instead, modern-day monitorships have been employed in an ad-hoc
and reactionary manner, which has resulted in repeated instances of controversy
and calls for reform. Underlying these calls for reform has been an implicit as-
sumption that broad-based rules can effectively regulate all monitorships.
Yet, when tested, this assumption is found lacking. This Article traces the
rise of the modern-day monitorship and, for the first time, analyzes the use of
monitorships in five different contexts. The analysis demonstrates that modern-
day monitorships have experienced a rapid evolution with important conse-
quences. First, as the Apple monitorship demonstrates, this evolution has
changed the manner in which courts and lawyers conceive of the appropriate
boundaries and norms for court-ordered monitorships. Second, as the Penn State
scandal reveals, private organizations are co-opting the use of monitorships,
which may transform the nature of monitorships from a quasi-governmental en-
forcement mechanism to a privatized reputation remediation tool. Third, moni-
torships fall into different categories based on the type of remediation effort the
monitorship is meant to achieve. Because these different categories necessitate
different monitorship structures to achieve the goals of each monitorship, at-
tempts to adopt universal rules governing monitorships may be misguided In
short, differences matter when evaluating monitorships.
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Introduction
When hundreds of thousands of families lost their homes as a result of improper
bank foreclosures, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") and the
Federal Reserve entered into agreements with banks initiating what came to be
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known as the "Independent Foreclosure Review"--a modem-day monitorship.' As
part of the Independent Foreclosure Review, the banks retained "independent con-
sultants"-monitors 2 -to ensure that they properly "remediate[d] all financial injury
to borrowers caused by any errors, misrepresentations, or other deficiencies. 3
Whether the misconduct is an effort to improperly foreclose on homeowners'
mortgages, 4 a bribe in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA"),5 an
anticompetitive business practice, 6 or a failure to detect and prevent repeated child
abuse,7 modem-day monitorships are important remediation tools. They are used af-
ter misconduct is discovered within an organization to address and remedy the harm
that the firm's misconduct has caused and to provide information to interested third
parties about the organization's progress toward reform. 8 As such, the monitor is (i)
an independent, private outsider, (ii) employed after an institution is found to have
engaged in wrongdoing, (iii) who effectuates remediation of the institution's miscon-
duct, and (iv) provides information to outside actors about the status of the institu-
tion's remediation efforts.
During the Independent Foreclosure Review, the independent consultants were
charged specifically with "conduct[ing] an independent review of certain residential
foreclosure actions regarding individual borrowers with respect to the Bank's mort-
gage servicing portfolio." 9 This is a relatively common task in modem-day monitor-
ships. A limited investigation ensues in an effort to oversee remediation efforts. The
goal, however, is not to conduct a full-out internal investigation, as evidenced by the
monitor's ability to rely on previously conducted investigations by the monitored
1. See, e.g., What You Need to Know: Independent Foreclosure Review, BD. OF
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. REs. Sys. (May 12, 2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/consumerinfo/inde-
pendent-foreclosure-review.htm.
2. This Article uses the term monitor because that word has become a term of art for
this kind of independent, private outsider. This term is used in scholarship, the news media, and Depart-
ment of Justice ("DOJ") guidance and settlement agreements. It appears to be the term of consensus.
Agreements will, however, often use terms other than monitor, like the term "independent consultant."
3. Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Takes Enforcement
Action Against Eight Servicers for Unsafe and Unsound Foreclosure Practices (Apr. 13, 2011),
http://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/201 l/nr-occ-2011-47.html.
4. See About the Settlement, JOINT ST.-FED. NAT'L MORTG. SERVICING SETTLEMENTS,
http://www.nationalmortgagesettlement.com/about (last visited Oct. 1, 2015) [hereinafter Nat 'l Mortgage
Settlement].
5. Total, S.A., Exchange Act Release No. 69,654, [2013 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 80,307, at 85,532 (May 29, 2013).
6. Exhibit C: Monitor Agreement, In re Johnson & Johnson, No. C-4363, 2012 WL
3518630 (F.T.C. Aug. 7, 2012).
7. Ben Kercheval, NCAA Tabs 'Mitchell Report' Leader as Penn State Integrity Moni-
tor, NBCSPORTS.COM (Aug. 1, 2012, 7:36 PM), http://collegefootball-
talk.nbcsports.com/2012/08/01/ncaa-tabs-mitchell-report-leader-as-penn-state-integrity-monitor ("As
Athletics Integrity Monitor, Mitchell will evaluate Penn State's compliance with NCAA sanctions and the
Athletics Integrity Agreement it will execute with the NCAA and the Big Ten Conference.").
8. See, e.g., Veronica Root, The Monitor- "Client" Relationship, 100 VA. L. REV. 523
(2014); F. Joseph Warin, Michael S. Diamant & Veronica S. Root, Somebody's Watching Me: FCPA
Monitorships and How They Can Work Better, 13 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 321, 347-48 (2011).
9. See, e.g.,Consent Order at 14, In re Bank of America, N.A., 2011 WL 6941540 (U.S.
Dep't of Treasury Apr. 13, 2011).
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firm. 0 This is because the monitorship's goal is not to discover wrongdoing-that is
already a given-but rather the monitorship is a remediation tool charged with over-
seeing the firm's attempts to remedy the harm caused by the organizational miscon-
duct.I' For an organization that has lost credibility and trust that it will engage in
effective self-policing, the monitorship serves as a powerful mechanism for supply-
ing information to interested outsiders, including courts, regulators, prosecutors, or
the public.
Yet modern-day monitorships have often been the subject of scandal and criti-
cism. The Independent Foreclosure Review is a prime example. After the independ-
ent consultants generated approximately $2 billion in fees for the foreclosure re-
views, 12  a congressional investigation ensued, 13  a damning Government
Accountability Office ("GAO") report was issued,'4 and the review was abruptly
terminated.' 5 The independent consultants blamed the regulators' review structure,
as did the GAO,16 while the regulators requested statutory authority to sanction the
independent consultants. 17 This debacle is only the latest of a myriad of monitorship
10. For example, the independent consultants retained in the Independent Foreclosure
Review were permitted to "consider any work already done by the Bank or other third-parties on behalf
of the Bank." Id. at 15.
11. If the monitor were to find additional misconduct or wrongdoing at the monitored
organization, then it is often required to report the misconduct. See Root, supra note 8, at 536 n.52.
12. Jesse Hamilton & Cheyenne Hopkins, OCC Asks for Enforcement Powers Against
Banks' Consultants, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Apr. 11, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-
04-1 O/occ-asks-for-enforcement-powers-against-outside-consultant-firms.
13. Danielle Douglas, Lawmakers Question Use of Consultants in Foreclosure Review,
WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.comibusiness/economy/lawmakers-question-
use-of-consultants-in-foreclosure-review/2013/04/1l/3395de64-al 41-11 e2-be47-b44febada3a8
_story.html.
14. Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, US. Efforts to Regulate Consultants Face
Big Obstacles, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Apr. 10, 2013, 6:00 PM), http://dealbook.ny-
times.con/2013/04/I 0/despite-pressure-to-police-consultants-regulators-face-obstacles.
15. Michael Corkery, G.A.O. Report Sees Deeper Bank Flaws in Foreclosure, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK (Apr. 28, 2014, 9:04 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/04/28/g-a-o-report-sees-
deeper-bank-flaws-in-foreclosures.
16. U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-277, LESSONS LEARNED COULD
ENHANCE CONTINUING REVIEWS AND ACTIVITIES UNDER AMENDED CONSENT ORDERS (2013); see Fran-
cine McKenna, GAO Blames Regulators for Faulty Foreclosure Reviews But That's Not the Whole Story,
FORBES (Apr. 4,2013, 8:13 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/francinemckenna/2013/04/04/gao-blames-
regulators-for-faulty-foreclosure-reviews-but-thats-not-the-whole-story; Douglas, supra note 13 ('Broad
guidance and limited monitoring' from regulators 'reduced the potential usefulness of data from consult-
ants and increased risks of inconsistency,' the report said.").
17. Hamilton & Hopkins, supra note 12. It is worth noting that, if this legislation were
passed, it would cover consultant wrongdoing whether the consultants were employed as monitors to assist
in remediation or as gatekeepers charged with preventing and detecting misconduct in the first instance.
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scandals. Controversies have arisen related to monitorship costs, 18 allegations of cro-
nyism in the selection of monitors, 19 and concerns regarding the appropriate legal
authority of courts when imposing monitorships.
20
These scandals often spur calls for reform. As a result, concerns regarding mon-
itorships are recounted in academic articles, 2' proposed legislation, 22 and the news.
23
18. See Transparency and Integrity in Corporate Monitoring: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111 th Cong. 46-48 (2009)
(statement of Eileen R. Larence, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, Government Accountability
Office) (detailing corporations' concerns with "the overall cost of ... monitorship").
19. See, e.g., Philip Shenon, Ashcroft Deal Brings Scrutiny in Justice Dept., N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 10, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/l0/washington/l0justice.html (highlighting concerns
with multimillion dollar monitorship contract involving John Ashcroft, the former boss of the federal
prosecutor handling the case).
20. See infra Part II.C.
21. Even with the widespread use of monitorships and their extensive coverage in the
news media, legal scholarship discussing monitorships and the role of monitors is still in its early stages.
E.g., Root, supra note 8 (discussing Corporate Compliance Monitorships and arguing that they could
benefit from a set of clear, enforceable, predictable rules regarding confidentiality, which would facilitate
the corporate compliance monitor's function as a legal counselor); Christie Ford & David Hess, Can Cor-
porate Monitorships Improve Corporate Compliance?, 34 J. CORP. L. 679, 732-34 (2009) [hereinafter
Ford & Hess, Monitorships Improve]; Christie Ford & David Hess, Corporate Monitorships and New
Governance Regulation: In Theory, In Practice, and In Context, 33 L. & POL'Y 509 (2011) (recommend-
ing a new governance approach to monitorships) [hereinafter Ford & Hess, Corporate Monitorships];
Vikramaditya Khanna, Reforming the Corporate Monitor?, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: USING
CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT 226,236 (Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow
eds., 2011) (discussing possible reforms for corporate monitors); Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L.
Dickinson, The Corporate Monitor: The New Corporate Czar?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1713 (2007) (provid-
ing "descriptive [and] normative analyses of the role and scope of corporate monitors" that includes an
examination of "when it is desirable to appoint monitors and what powers and obligations they should
have"); Caelah E. Nelson, Corporate Compliance Monitors Are Not Superheroes with Unrestrained
Power: A Callfor Increased Oversight and Ethical Reform, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 723 (2014); Jennifer
O'Hare, The Use of the Corporate Monitor in SEC Enforcement Actions, I BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM.
L. 89 (2006) (discussing the WorldCom monitorship); Warin, Diamant & Root, supra note 8. Other schol-
arship discusses monitors within the context of other issues related to corporate governance, crime, or
compliance. See, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: How PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH
CORPORATIONS 172-95 (2014) (discussing mechanisms for improving corporate law enforcement); Law-
rence D. Finder & Ryan D. McConnell, Devolution ofAuthority: The Department of Justice's Corporate
Charging Policies, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1 (2006) (explaining the use of monitors under the Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines, which led to monitors in pre-trial agreements); Thomas F. O'Neil, III & T. Bren-
dan Kennedy, Answering to a Higher Authority: Sovereign-Mandated Oversight in the Board Room and
the C-Suite, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 299, 300 (2012) (discussing the "evolution of private sector
oversight and its implementation domestically" and offering "refinements and solutions to all constituen-
cies related to the selection, retention and deployment of independent consultants and monitor"); Elizabeth
R. Sheyn, The Humanization of the Corporate Entity: Changing Views of Corporate Criminal Liability in
the Wake ofCitizens United, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (2010) (discussing monitors within a broader discus-
sion regarding the effect of Citizens United on corporate criminal liability); D. Daniel Sokol, Policing the
Firm, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 785, 788-90 (2013) (suggesting mechanisms for improving criminal anti-
trust enforcement, including the use of monitors in the criminal antitrust context).
22. Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act of 2009, H.R. 1947, 111th Cong.
(2009); Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act of 2008, H.R. 6492, 110th Cong. (2008).
23. See Douglas, supra note 13 (discussing congressional investigation of monitorship
in Independent Foreclosure Review).
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Implicit in what has become a predictable and repeated backlash to monitorships is
an underlying belief that monitorships can be regulated wholesale.
24
For example, scholarly calls for reform have addressed monitorships in a com-
prehensive manner. 25 Additionally, proposed congressional legislation attempted to
regulate monitorships as if they were a homogenous phenomenon. 26 Moreover, ad-
vice to practitioners regarding the use of monitorships has addressed the topic as if it
were a uniform remediation tool.27 Furthermore, the imposition of monitorships by
certain regulators has revealed a lack of understanding regarding the inherent com-
plexities of monitorships.28 Finally, even when the heterogeneity of monitorships is
acknowledged, as it was in guidance to prosecutors regarding the use of monitor-
ships,2 9 the full breadth and scope of responsibilities delegated to monitorships is not
fully acknowledged. 3°
This Article challenges the implicit assumption that modem-day monitorships
are a uniform phenomenon. It conducts a systematic, in-depth review of monitor-
ships, revealing that (i) monitorships can be classified into separate categories based
upon the type of remediation effort that the monitored organization is engaged in to
redress misconduct and (ii) these categories continue to evolve, suggesting that many
previous attempts at monitorship reform may be inadequate or incomplete. Specifi-
cally, monitorships were traditionally employed by courts to ensure specific perfor-
mance with courts' orders. But modem-day monitorships are often used outside the
purview of the court, and even when a court is involved, the monitor is often dele-
gated authority that goes beyond ensuring a party's specific performance with a
court's order. The Article then demonstrates that common priorities of monitorship
reform-court oversight, transparency and confidentiality concerns, and duties
within the monitorship relationship-result in differing analyses and conclusions de-
24. For example, the consent orders governing the Independent Foreclosure Review
suggested that the OCC believed it had sufficient experience with monitorships to craft an effective, ex-
ternal remediation process ex ante. But during congressional testimony, it was readily conceded that
"[d]espite the detail in the consent orders and in the engagement letters, the scale and complexity of the
[Independent Foreclosure Review] engagements were unprecedented and had not been entirely anticipated
before the engagements began." Hamilton & Hopkins, supra note 12.
25. See, e.g., Ford & Hess, Corporate Monitorships, supra note 21; Ford & Hess, Man-
itorships Improve, supra note 21; Khanna, supra note 21; Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 21; Nelson,
supra note 21.
26. Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act of 2009, H.R. 1947, 111 th Cong.
(2009); Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act of 2008, H.R. 6492, 110th Cong. (2008).
27. See, e.g., Warin, Diamant & Root, supra note 8.
28. For example, the consent orders governing the Independent Foreclosure Review
suggested that the OCC believed it had sufficient experience with monitorships to craft an effective, ex-
ternal remediation process ex ante. But during congressional testimony, it was readily conceded that
"[d]espite the detail in the consent orders and in the engagement letters, the scale and complexity of the
[Independent Foreclosure Review] engagements were unprecedented and had not been entirely anticipated
before the engagements began." Hamilton & Hopkins, supra note 12.
29. Memorandum from Craig S. Morford, Acting Deputy Att'y Gen., to Heads of De-
partment Components and United States Attorneys (Mar. 7, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/dag/morford-
useofmonitorsmemo-03072008.pdf (outlining principles to consider when selecting and using a corporate
monitor).
30. The Morford Memo fails to acknowledge that monitors sometimes provide activities
above and beyond assessing compliance with the terms of a specific agreement with the government. See
id.
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pending upon the type of monitorship examined. Thus, the Article argues that uni-
form rules governing all modem-day monitorships are, at best, likely to be less ef-
fective than previously believed, or, at worst, misguided. In short, the differences
amongst monitorships matter when analyzing proposed reforms aimed at regulating
monitorships.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I documents the rise of the modem-day
monitorship. Part II analyzes monitorships in different contexts, demonstrating that
monitorships are evolving and take a variety of forms. These forms are an outgrowth
of the types of remediation efforts necessary to address the underlying organizational
misconduct. Using the findings from Part II, Part III demonstrates that monitorships
are difficult to regulate in a uniform manner on account of their differing structures
and remediation efforts. Finally, Part IV discusses how the Article's analysis could
influence considerations regarding the use of monitorships for scholars, courts, prac-
titioners, and lawmakers.
I. The Rise of the Modem-Day Monitorship.
The need for and rise of the modern-day monitorship is an outgrowth of three
related phenomena: (i) the evolution of the use of traditional, court-appointed agents,
(ii) an increase in the complexity of regulatory and legal requirements facing organ-
izations, and (iii) the use of external gatekeepers to assist organizations in their ef-
forts to comply with a more challenging and demanding regulatory environment.
This Part begins with a description of traditional, court-appointed agents, which are
sometimes referred to as monitors, and explains how, over time, these agents con-
tributed to the rise of the modem-day monitorship. The Part goes on to explain how
complicated regulatory and legal systems created the need to rely upon external gate-
keepers to detect and prevent organizational misconduct. The reliance on external
gatekeepers became commonly accepted and grew in scope during a time of increas-
ing regulatory and legal complexity.3' This complexity resulted in the use of inde-
pendent, private outsiders in roles beyond that of detection and prevention and into
roles that included responsibility for overseeing organizational remediation efforts.
The Part demonstrates that the nation's enforcement regime transitioned from one
where the governmental agency took primary responsibility for monitoring enforce-
ment to one where the government outsourced this responsibility. These events con-
verged to create a system wherein it became acceptable to rely heavily on modem-
day monitorships to assist with and evaluate the efficacy of organizational remedia-
tion efforts in other contexts.
31. See, e.g., MAX H. BAZERMAN & ANN E. TENBRUNSEL, BLIND SPOTS: WHY WE FAIL
TO Do WHAT'S RIGHT AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 3 (2014) (explaining that "numerous scandals... in
the new millennium have damaged our confidence in our businesses and our leaders," creating "pressure
to become more ethical" and requiring "organizations and financial organizations [to] undertake[] efforts
aimed at improving and enforcing ethical behavior").
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Courts have used independent, private outsiders--court-appointed agents-to as-
sist courts in their adjudication efforts for decades. 32 These individuals are referred
to by a number of terms often used interchangeably, including master, special master,
receiver, trustee, or monitor. 33 The traditional purpose of those serving as agents of
the court was to help "a judge process complex evidence at the trial stage of proceed-
ings by taking evidence on specific issues and making a preliminary analysis and
recommendation." 34 Over time, however, the role evolved to include activities after
an organization was found to have engaged in wrongdoing. "[A]fter a finding of lia-
bility, [the Monitor is] often appointed at the remedial stage of complex cases to aid
in formulating the decree, assist the court in implementing it, and monitor compli-
ance." 35 In other words, the monitor is employed to ensure the monitored organiza-
tion's specific performance with the court's orders and to report on the progress of
these efforts directly to the court.
36
In federal courts, the court's authority to appoint a monitor in civil 37 cases comes
from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") 53. Under FRCP 53, a monitor can
be appointed in three instances: (i) to "perform duties consented to by the parties," 38
(ii) to "hold trial proceedings and make or recommend findings of fact on issues to
be decided without a jury if appointment is warranted, ' 39 or (iii) to "address pretrial
and posttrial matters that cannot be effectively and timely addressed by an available
district judge or magistrate judge of the district."4 The Traditional, Court-Ordered
Monitorships that likely led to the initial rise of modern-day monitorships most often
fell under the third provision; monitorships were employed to assist the court in
posttrial matters.4 1 One type of posttrial matter with which court-appointed agents
32. This Article does not provide a complete historical tracing of the origins of moni-
torships. That history has been outlined in previous scholarship. See Root, supra note 8, at 526; Ford &
Hess, Monitorships Improve, supra note 21, at 683; Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 21, at 1715 (dis-
cussing the historical underpinnings of corporate monitors and relating corporate monitors to the use of
special masters, which dates back to the early sixteenth century)..
33. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982); GARRETr, supra note 21,
at 175.
34. Ellen E. Deason, Managing the Managerial Expert, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 341, 351
(1998) (discussing the ability of a court to appoint an outsider to assist the court under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 53).
35. Id. at 352.
36. The Court-Ordered Monitor is someone the court appoints to act as its agent to per-
form a specific task on behalf of the court. See, e.g., Diaz v. San Jose Unified Sch. Dist., 633 F. Supp.
808, 824 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (describing the compliance monitor as "an am of the court" and "not the agent
of either party").
37. In criminal cases, courts are permitted in some circumstances to order probation,
which may include the imposition of a formal probation officer. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL §§ 8D1.1-1.5 (2014).
38. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(a)(l)(A).
39. FED. R. CIv. P. 53(a)(l)(B).
40. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a)(1)(C).
41. The idea of allowing the appointment of a monitor to engage in duties consented to
by the parties does, however, look like a precursor to the modem-day Corporate Compliance Monitorship.
See Part lI.B.
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assisted courts was to ensure that parties complied with a court's order of specific
performance.
For example, in 1988, the Department of Justice ("DOJ") brought a civil Race-
teer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act lawsuit against leaders within the In-
ternational Brotherhood of Teamsters ("IBT"). The suit resulted in a settlement
agreement that, in part, required a court-appointed Election Officer, sometimes re-
ferred to as an Election Monitor, 42 "to supervise fair and democratic elections of the
general president and other international union officers." 43 The goal of the lawsuit
"was to purge organized crime's influence" from the IBT. 44 The court granted the
Election Monitor authority to "supervise" the IBT's elections, and provided guidance
regarding the types of activities the monitor should engage in to effectuate the court's
mandate. Specifically,
"In advance of each election, the Election Officer shall have the right to distribute materials
about the election to the IBT membership. The Election Officer shall supervise the balloting
process and certify the election results for each of these elections as promptly as possible after
the balloting." The consent order invested the [Election Officer] with "authority to employ ac-
countants, consultants, experts, investigators, or any other personnel .... " It also set forth basic
rules to govern IBT elections for international officials, including procedures for convention
delegate selection, nomination of international officers, and direct mail rank-and-file voting for
international officers.4 5
Unsurprisingly, a great deal of tension existed between the Court-Ordered Monitor
and the union.46 Specifically, the IBT claimed that the Election Monitor's staff was
"unnecessary and unwarranted" and that their salaries were "excessive." 47 The court,
however, dismissed the IBT's objections and ordered the Election Monitor to con-
tinue to actively oversee, "intervene in," and "coordinate" the "IBT electoral pro-
cess" as necessary to ensure compliance with the court's order.48
The use of Traditional, Court-Ordered Monitors continues today, even while the
modern-day monitorship has become an important remediation tool. For example, in
2011, a district court issued an opinion explaining its decision to require the appoint-
ment of a Court-Ordered Monitor to address long-term, systemic discrimination
against black and Hispanic applicants to the New York City Fire Department
("FDNY"). 49 The court's specific remedial measures were extremely detailed and
provided the Court-Ordered Monitor a clear and robust roadmap regarding the activ-
ities for which it was responsible. 50 As the court stated:
42. See Election Monitor Requests Delay in Teamsters Voting, CNN (Sept. 9, 1998),
http://www.cnn.comiUS/9809/09/teamsters.elex.delay.
43. James B. Jacobs & Dimitri D. Portnoi, Combating Organized Crime with Union
Democracy: A Case Study of the Election Reform in United States v. International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, 42 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 335, 337-38 (2009).
44. Id at 339.
45. Id. at 344 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 345.
48. United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 723 F. Supp. 203, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
49. United States v. City of New York, No. 07-2067, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115074,
at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2011). The court relied upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 as its authority
for appointing the monitor. Id.
50. Id. at *35-49.
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The Court Monitor will take primary responsibility for leading the parties through the
specific remedial steps the court requires the parties to complete. Moreover, the Court Monitor
will have the duty and the authority to proactively audit and investigate the City's compliance
with the terms of the Draft Remedial Order. For example, the Court Monitor will have the au-
thority to perform independent investigations of the FDNY's EEO compliance program and the
post-examination screening phase of the City's process for selecting entry-level firefighters.
A court monitor is necessary because the court lacks the time and resources to perform
the supervisory tasks necessary to ensure that the City carries out its obligations under the Draft
Remedial Order in good faith and with reasonable diligence. District courts have frequently
made use of court-appointed monitors and other masters in similarly large and complex civil
rights litigations where ensuring a large organization's or municipality's compliance with the
court's orders would be too time-consuming or difficult for the court to undertake without as-
sistance.51
The district court ultimately appointed a Court-Ordered Monitor for a ten-year
term.52 As in the IBT case, the City of New York objected vigorously to the Court-
Ordered Monitorship, with some objections related to the cost.53 Ultimately, how-
ever, the court permitted the monitor to continue its efforts to ensure the FDNY's
compliance with the court's order.54
Other examples abound, but the upshot is that Traditional, Court-Ordered Mon-
itorships assist courts in ensuring parties' compliance with courts' orders of specific
performance. However, the use of traditional, court-appointed agents has evolved 55
and thereby facilitated the rise of what this Article identifies as modem-day moni-
torships.
B. Increased Regulation Sparks Evolution
Regulatory and legal frameworks within the United States depend heavily on
organizational self-policing to prevent an organization's agents, employees, or mem-
bers from engaging in misconduct. This reliance on the organization to prevent its
own wrongdoing is both necessary and efficient. The government is unable to readily
detect many corporate crimes due to their occurrence within large, sophisticated or-
ganizations.5 6 Moreover, the government's limited resources make it impractical for
51. Id. at *49-50.
52. Editorial, FDNYMonitoris Excessively Billing the City, N.Y. POST (Dec. 16,2013),
http://nypost.com/2013/12/16/fdny-monitor-is-excessively-billing-the-city.
53. The city appealed to the Second Circuit and received a temporary stay of the moni-
tor's work. Jessica Dye, N.YC. Wins Bid to Block Monitor's Work in FDNY Discrimination Case,
REUTERS (Feb. 9, 2013), http://www.ufanyc.org/cms/contents/view/14908. But the work ultimately re-
sumed when the district court's ruling was partially upheld. Joshua Saul, Cost to Taxpayers for Enforcing
FDNY Diversity? $3M So Far, N.Y. POST (Dec. 16, 2013), http://nypost.com/2013/12/1 6/fdny-monitor-
bums-through-3m-in-taxpayer-money-lawyer.
54. Saul, supra note 53.
55. See Root, supra note 8, at 529-31; Ford & Hess, Monitorships Improve, supra note
21, at 683; Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 2 1, at 1715-16.
56. See Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liabil-
ity, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 835 (1994); see also Brian R. Cheffins, Corporate Governance Since the
Managerial Capitalism Era, BUS. HISTORY REV. (forthcoming), http://ssm.com/abstract-2618480 (dis-
cussing changes in corporate governance and the different challenges faced by executives running com-
panies in the 1950s and 1960s and those facing corporate scandals in the 1970s and early 2000s).
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it to intensely monitor the activities of every firm. Over the past two decades specif-
ically, government regulatory schemes have become increasingly elaborate (i) in re-
sponse to corporate scandals and (ii) as organizations have expanded the size and
breadth of their activities, 57 making compliance with legal requirements a more com-
plex and challenging endeavor.
5 8
In response to this more complicated regulatory and legal environment, organi-
zations began to depend more heavily on corporate governance reforms 59 and on a
variety of gatekeepers, both within and external to the firm, to effectuate their self-
policing efforts. 60 Thus, the importance of gatekeeping-a key component of the
corporate governance process that "occurs prior to wrongdoing and is an assurance
that investors and the public should trust that the corporation being assessed is acting
within appropriate ethical, regulatory, and legal bounds" 6 1-increased exponentially,
as evidenced by a marked increase in gatekeeping literature. 62 Gatekeepers come in
numerous forms, including the external auditors who ensure that organizations are
properly reporting their financial information 63 and the in-house counsel who are
charged with detecting misconduct. 64 Many gatekeepers are extemal-independent,
private outsiders-to the firm utilizing their gatekeeping services as part of its self-
policing effort. Yet when gatekeepers, either internal or external, fail to prevent
wrongdoing, it creates an enforcement conundrum.
In many instances, the failure of organizational gatekeepers to prevent wrong-
doing results in reluctance to permit the organization to maintain complete autonomy
over remediation efforts. Yet the same concerns that made self-policing a necessity-
particularly governmental capacity constraints--continue to be at play. This problem
requires a solution that allows for external monitoring from non-governmental ac-
tors. Government agencies thus began to rely on modern-day monitorships to oversee
and assist embroiled firms in remediation efforts after the government and organiza-
tion entered into an agreement to resolve the underlying misconduct.
1. Direct Governmental Monitoring
The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") is one such agency that has, over time,
begun to rely more heavily on modem-day monitorships to assist it in monitoring
57. Cheffins, supra note 56, at 26-27, 36-38 (discussing corporate scandals of the early
2000s, including Enron and WorldCom, and the adoption of regulation like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002).
58. GARRETT, supra note 21, at 6.
59. Cheffins, supra note 56, at 18, 26-35 (explaining that a focus on "corporate govern-
ance" achieved broad-based recognition in the 1990s).
60. See generally JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., The Rise, Fall, and Redefinition of the Auditor:
From Bookkeeper to Professional to Information Consultant, in GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 108-91 (2006) (discussing the effects of the Enron scandal and the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act on the legal profession and a new duty for lawyers to act as gatekeepers, which ultimately
resulted in the current Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.13).
61. Root, supra note 8, at 526.
62. Notably, there has been an explosion of gatekeeping literature over the past two
decades.
63. COFFEE, supra note 60, at 108-71.
64. Sung Hui Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411, 445-46
(2008).
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firms' remediation efforts. The FTC is an independent federal agency charged with
preventing "business practices that are anticompetitive or deceptive or unfair to con-
sumers."6 Specialized governmental units, such as the FTC, often enter into agree-
ments resolving allegations of organizational wrongdoing without formal court in-
volvement. When this occurs, the government agency may simply require the
organization to enter into remediation efforts and provide confirmation of these ef-
forts to the government. 66 The government utilizes this option when it deems it ap-
propriate to allow the organization engaged in wrongdoing to maintain control over
remediation efforts. If, however, the government determines that the organization
needs more active monitoring, it can launch its own heightened monitoring of the
organization,67 thereby taking direct responsibility for ensuring the organization's
compliance.
For example, in March 1999, the FTC entered into a ten-year consent order 68
with Intel Corporation ("Intel") related to Intel's alleged misuse of "its market power
to maintain its dominance over the microprocessor market."6 9 The consent order in-
cluded a provision stating:
[F]or the purpose of determining or securing compliance with this Order, upon written request,
Respondent [Intel] shall permit any duly authorized representative of the Commission:
A. Access, during office hours and in the presence of counsel, to all facilities and
access to inspect and copy all books, ledgers, accounts, correspondence, memoranda
and other records and documents in the possession or under the control of [Intel] relating to
any matters contained in this Order; and
B. Upon five days' notice to [Intel] and without restraint or interference from them
to interview officers, directors, or employees of Respondent, who may have counsel present.
70
Thus, in 1999, it appears the FTC intended to keep monitoring of Intel's compliance
an internal responsibility.
2. Outsourcing of Monitoring to Governmental Agent
While many agencies continue to maintain direct enforcement and monitoring
control,7 others have slowly outsourced some of these responsibilities to modern-
65. About the FTC, FED. TRADE COMM'N, http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc (last visited
Sept. 29, 2015).
66. See, e.g., Decision and Order, In re Pool Corporation, No. C-4345, 2012 WL 159752
(F.T.C. Jan. 10, 2012). In the FCPA context, there appears to be a trend toward allowing companies to
oversee their own remediation efforts. See 2014 FCPA and Related Enforcement Actions, U.S. DEP'T
JUST., http://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/case/related-enforcement-actions/2014 (last visited Nov. 8,
2015).
67. See, e.g., In re Intel Corp., No. 9288, 1999 WL 164046 (F.T.C. Mar. 1, 1999) [here-
inafter 1999 Intel].
68. While termed a "consent order," a traditional court was not involved in the imposi-
tion of this order. The order was issued by the FTC commissioners. Id.
69. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Accepts Settlement of Charges Against
Intel (Mar. 17, 1999), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/1999/O3/ftc-accepts-settlement-
charges-against-intel.
70. 1999 Intel, supra note 67.
71. Bank Examiners employed by the OCC are a good example of governmental en-
forcement employees who directly supervise legal and regulatory compliance. See, e.g., Entry-Level Bank
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day monitorships, which assist the government in its enforcement efforts.72 The reli-
ance on modem-day monitorships allows for greater supervision of organizations
than the government itself has the capacity to provide. It also shifts the costs of mon-
itoring to the offending organization, which is generally held responsible for paying
the associated costs.7 3 The use of independent, private outsiders for remediation ef-
forts is a natural extension of the use of independent, private outsiders for prevention
and detection efforts. 74 Moreover, in instances where the independent, private out-
sider definitively operates as an agent of the government agency, it appears that the
practice is also a natural development of the use of court-appointed agents.
For example, in 2010, Intel and the FTC again entered into a consent order 75
regarding charges that Intel allegedly "stifled competition in the market for computer
chips." 76 The consent order, in part, stated:
A. At any time after this Order becomes final, and for the limited purpose of assisting the Com-
mission in monitoring and enforcing [Intel's] compliance.., the [FTC] may appoint one or
more Technical Consultants, subject to the consent of [Intel] whose consent shall not be unrea-
sonably withheld....
B. [Intel] shall, not later than ten (10) days after appointment, execute an agreement with any
Technical Consultant that, subject to the approval of the [FTC], . . . provides, among other
things, that the Technical Consultant shall act in a fiduciary capacity for the benefit of the [FTC].
Any Technical Consultants appointed by the [FTC] shall serve without bond or surety at the
expense of [Intel] on such reasonable and customary terms and conditions as the [FTC] may set
and as provided in the agreement.
77
Thus, in 2010, it appears that the FTC intended to outsource monitoring of Intel's
compliance with the consent order to an independent, private outsider. The Technical
Consultant was retained to oversee Intel's specific performance with respect to the
consent order and was seemingly acting solely as the government's agent.
Monitorships where the monitor is retained primarily to assist the government
in its efforts to ensure enforcement of agreed upon remediation efforts remain com-
mon and are essentially an outgrowth of Traditional, Court-Ordered Monitorships.78
The government provides very detailed requirements regarding what efforts the or-
ganization is to adopt going forward, giving the monitor a concrete roadmap of what
Examiners, OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, http://www.careers.occ.gov/careers/ex-
plore/bank-supervision/entry-level-mcbs/index-entry-level-mcbs.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2015).
72. See, e.g., Decision and Order, In re Intel Corp., No. 9341,2010 WL4542454 (F.T.C.
Nov. 2, 2010) [hereinafter 2010 Intel].
73. Id.
74. Adopting these sorts of models allows for (i) "broaden[ing] the decision-making
playing field by involving more actors in the various stages of the legal process," (ii) "diversif[ying] the
types of expertise and experience that those new actors bring to the table," (iii) "engag[ing] multiple ac-
tors," and (iv) greater self-regulation. Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise
of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 373, 375 (2004).
75. Again, while termed a "consent order," a traditional court was not involved in the
imposition of this order. The order was issued by the five FTC commissioners. 2010 Intel, supra note 72.
76. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Approves Modified Intel Settlement Order
(Nov. 2, 2010), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/20 10/1 1/ftc-approves-modified-intel-set-
tlement-order.
77. 2010 Intel, supra note 72, slip op. at 18.
78. See infra Part II.B.
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precisely it is to supervise. This setup is, however, just one type of remediation effort
effectuated through monitorship programs.
3. Government and Monitored Organization Agreeing to the Retention of
an Independent, Private Outsider
Another type of remediation effort occurs when monitors are charged with more
than just enforcement monitoring and are not limited to acting solely as the govern-
ment's agents.79 In many instances, after the discovery of an organization's miscon-
duct, an agreement is reached between the government and the corporation wherein
the corporation consents to retain a monitor who engages in something more than
rote compliance monitoring.80 Instead, the monitor is focused on performing a root-
cause analysis. 8 1 Specifically, the monitor is "retained to investigate the compliance
failure that resulted in the legal or regulatory violation, assess the cause of the com-
pliance failure, and analyze the company's unique business structures against the
[applicable] legal and regulatory requirements." 82 In these instances, the monitor is
in a cooperative relationship with the government and the organization. The monitor
develops a direct relationship with the organization itself Thus, the use of monitors
as a means to assist purely in governmental enforcement efforts morphed into a mon-
itorship structure where the monitor could also provide concrete value to the organ-
ization that initially engaged in the wrongdoing that triggered the need for the mon-
itor. This arrangement is, however, just another type of remediation effort. Instead
of focusing on compensating those harmed, the monitor aims to develop a plan-
consulting both the government and the monitored organization-that will ensure the
monitored organization improves its legal and regulatory compliance.
For example, in 2012, Biomet, Inc. ("Biomet") "entered into a deferred prose-
cution agreement" ("DPA") with the DOJ to resolve allegations that it made im-
proper payments to "publicly-employed health care providers in Argentina, Brazil
and China to secure lucrative business with hospitals."8 3 As part of the agreement,
Biomet agreed to retain a monitor for eighteen months. The monitor's primary re-
sponsibility was to "assess and monitor Biomet's compliance with the terms" of the
DPA.84 However, the monitor was also encouraged to work with Biomet to develop
an understanding of the facts surrounding the alleged violations, create work plans,
and determine if Biomet should be eligible to conclude the monitorship early. 85 In
79. See generally Root, supra note 8 (discussing the monitor's role in investigating the
root cause of an organization's misconduct and providing recommendations aimed at preventing the mis-
conduct in the future).
80. Id. at 528, 531.
81. Id. at 531.
82. Id. at 524-25.
83. Press Release, U.S. Dep't Just., Third Medical Device Company Resolves Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act Investigation (Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.j ustice.gov/opa/pr/third-medical-device-
company-resolves-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-investigation.
84. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at Attachment D 1 2, United States v. Biomet, Inc.,
No. 1:12-cr-00080 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/bi-
omet/2012-03-26-biomet-dpa.pdf.
85. Id. at Jill 4-5.
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addition, the monitor was charged with "making recommendations reasonably de-
signed to improve the effectiveness of Biomet's program for ensuring compliance
with the anti-corruption laws," which is a service the monitor provided to assist both
the government and Biomet in achieving Biomet's long-term legal and regulatory
compliance. 8
6
Again, this monitorship structure is a natural progression from use of modem-
day monitorships to assist the government in enforcement efforts. In regulatory grey
areas, it is often difficult to predetermine a set of mandates that an organizational
wrongdoer should follow going forward. That reality necessarily altered the focus
from monitors performing rote compliance enforcement to monitors assisting in the
development of a remediation program by helping to determine the steps needed for
achieving optimal legal and regulatory compliance at the firm in the future.
As the above discussion demonstrates, the modern-day monitorship is an out-
growth of (i) the use of court-appointed agents, (ii) an increasingly complex regula-
tory and legal environment, and (iii) the use of independent, private outsiders for
gatekeeping purposes. Importantly, each iteration appears to build upon the next. As
governmental constraints and regulatory complexity encouraged more dependence
on independent, private outsiders, the market for that type of service grew. The rise
of the modem-day monitorship is not quite as neat as the above description sug-
gests-the timelines are blurred and are ultimately related to when certain monitor-
ship structures became acceptable within particular industries. Importantly, the ap-
pearance of a new iteration of monitorship does not signify the demise of another
monitorship structure. That said, the modern-day monitorship is a relatively new phe-
nomenon with a vast reach in enforcement efforts across the nation.
II. Examples of Modem-Day Monitorships
Courts, the government, and monitored organizations use modem-day monitor-
ships every day to assist in remediation efforts. Monitors themselves look similar
across categories: (i) independent, private outsiders, (ii) employed after an institution
is found to have engaged in wrongdoing, (iii) who effectuate remediation of the in-
stitution's misconduct, and (iv) provide information to outside actors about the status
of the institution's remediation efforts. As a result, legal scholarship has implicitly
assumed that monitorships can be regulated wholesale. This assumption is evidenced
by continued suggestions for the adoption of a broad set of formal rules to govern all
monitorships.87
86. Id. at 5. Biomet's federal probation was scheduled to expire in early 2015, but it
made a disclosure suggesting additional wrongdoing at the company and its probation was extended an-
other year. Ben Protess, New Bribery Evidence Adds a Year to Biomet's Probation, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK, (Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/18/business/new-bribery-evidence-adds-
a-year-to-biomets-probation.html.
87. See, e.g., GARRETI, supra note 21, at 176-77, 192 (discussing the need for more
robust court oversight of all monitorships that are the outgrowth of a DPA or non-prosecution agreement);
Khanna, supra note 21, at 238-40 (discussing proposed legislation in the House of Representatives meant
to provide formal rules governing monitorships);.
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Yet the analysis in this Part reveals that monitorships can take many different
forms. They can be grouped into categories by focusing on the remediation effort the
monitorship is meant to achieve. This Part begins by describing what are likely the
two most common categories of modem-day monitorships-Enforcement and Cor-
porate Compliance Monitorships. It then demonstrates that monitorships are a dy-
namic and continually evolving phenomenon. For example, the Part explains how
modem-day monitorships may influence the manner in which courts employ Court-
Ordered Monitorships. Additionally, it identifies what may be an emerging type of
monitorship-a Public Relations Monitorship-that private companies have begun
to use on their own initiative to assist in reputation remediation efforts.
A. Enforcement Monitorships
After a high-profile scandal occurs at an organization, that organization often
enters into a consent order, deferred or non-prosecution agreement, or some other
formal resolution with the government. As part of these agreements, it is common
for the government to require a modem-day monitorship to oversee and ensure com-
pliance with the agreement. 88 The monitor in these monitorships-Enforcement
Monitorships-serves as an agent of the government and ensures that the monitored
organization is adhering to the government's mandate, found in the agreement be-
tween the organization and the government.
Enforcement Monitorships are primarily concerned with ensuring the organiza-
tion's specific performance with the requirements set out in the relevant agreement.
The government 9 provides very detailed requirements regarding what activities the
organization is to engage in going forward, which gives the monitor specific param-
eters on the types of organizational remediation efforts it is responsible for assessing.
The settlement of mortgage foreclosure misconduct ("National Mortgage Settle-
ment") amongst five banks90 and various federal and state governmental entities pro-
vides an example of an Enforcement Monitorship.9g The "unprecedented joint agree-
ment" in "the largest federal-state civil settlement ever obtained" required the
88. See, e.g., 2010 Intel, supra note 72.
89. Enforcement Monitorships are also found in non-governmental contexts where a
regulatory body oversees the conduct of its members or constituents. For example, Enforcement Monitor-
ships have been used to resolve World Bank Sanctions. See Voluntary Disclosure Program Protocol 8,
WORLD BANK, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTVOLDISPRO/Resources/2720448-
1300821628018/VDPProctocol_8.pdf. Additionally, the NCAA has used them in a similar way. See
Kercheval, supra note 7; George Mitchell, Second Annual Report of the Independent Athletics Integrity
Monitor Pursuant to the Athletics Integrity Agreement Among the National Collegiate Athletic Associa-
tion, The Big Ten Conference and The Pennsylvania State University and as External Monitor Appointed
by the Pennsylvania State University, DLA PIPER LLP (Sept. 8, 2014), https://www.dlapiper.com/-/me-
dia/files/insights/publications/2014/09/ncaamonitorssecondannualreport.pdf. Similarly, certain self-regu-
latory organizations, like the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FIN RA"), have the ability to sanc-
tion their members in a manner that often mimics a more formal governmental sanction. About FINRA,
FINRA, https://www.finra.org/about (last visited Nov. 8, 2015).
90. Ally/GMAC, Bank of America, Citi, JPMorgan Chase, and Wells Fargo are the
banks subject to the settlement. See Nat 'l Mortgage Settlement, supra note 4.
91. Press Release, U.S. Dep't Just., Federal Government and State Attorneys General
Reach $25 Billion Agreement with Five Largest Mortgage Servicers to Address Mortgage Loan Servicing
and Foreclosure Abuses (Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/February/12-ag-186.html
[hereinafter Nat'l Mortgage Settlement Press Release] (discussing "the deceptive practices in the offering
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retention of [a Monitor] who was tasked with "oversee[ing] implementation of the
servicing standards required by the agreement; impos[ing] penalties of up to S 1 mil-
lion per violation (or up to $5 million for certain repeat violations); and publish[ing]
regular public reports that identify any quarter in which a servicer fell short of the
standards imposed in the settlement."92 The monitor ensured the banks' specific per-
formance in providing: (i) "[i]mmediate aid to homeowners needing loan modifica-
tions," (ii) refinancing options for those current on their mortgages, "but whose mort-
gages currently exceed their home's value," (iii) "[p]ayments to borrowers who lost
their homes to foreclosure with no requirement to prove financial harm and without
having to release private claims against the servicers or the right to participate in the
OCC review process," and (iv) "nationwide reforms to servicing standards," includ-
ing requiring "single point of contact, adequate staffing levels and training, better
communication with borrowers, and appropriate standards for executing documents
in foreclosure cases, ending improper fees, and ending dual-track foreclosures for
many loans." 93 On March 18, 2014, the monitor filed "final crediting reports" con-
firming that the banks have "satisfied their consumer relief and refinancing obliga-
tions" under the National Mortgage Settlement. 94 In a statement released in conjunc-
tion with the reports, the monitor reported that "[i]n total, the servicers have provided
more than $50 billion of gross relief, which translates into more than $20 billion in
credited relief under the Settlement's scoring system. More than 600,000 families
received some form of relief."9
5
An Enforcement Monitorship was also used to oversee the State of Georgia's
compliance with a settlement agreement ("Georgia Settlement") arising out of viola-
tions of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). 96 Beginning in
of loan modifications" and the retention of an independent monitor to oversee compliance with a consent
agreement between the DOJ and Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase & Co., Wells Fargo & Company,
Citigroup Inc., and Ally Financial Inc.). Additionally, many states employed their own Independent Mon-
itors to oversee the state portions of the National Mortgage Settlement. See, e.g., Press Release, Univ. of
Calif., Irvine Sch. of Law, UCI Law Professor Katherine Porter Issues Final Report for California Monitor
Program (Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.law.uci.edu/news/press-releases/10-07-14.html. The Federal Reserve
and the OCC also initiated their own Independent Foreclosure Review, which required the retention of
independent consultants. These independent consultants looked much like Independent Monitors, alt-
hough the review was fraught with difficulties and was highly criticized. See Francine McKenna, Settling
the Foreclosure Reviews: Winners and Losers, FORBES (Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/fran-
cinemckenna/2013/01/08/settling-the-foreclosure-reviews-winners-and-losers; Ben Protess & Jessica Sil-
ver-Greenberg, Senator Criticizes Lack of Supervision for Banks' Consultants, N.Y. TIMEs DEALBOOK
(June 21, 2013, 10:27 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/06/20/senator-criticizes-lack-of-supervi-
sion-for-banks-consultants.
92. Nat'l Mortgage Settlement Press Release, supra note 91.
93. Nat'l Mortgage Settlement, supra note 4.
94. Final Crediting Report, OFF. OF THE MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT OVERSIGHT (Mar.
18, 2014), https://www.mortgageoversight.com/reports/final-crediting-report.
95. Id.
96. United States v. Georgia, No. 1:10-249 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 19, 2010),
http://www.ada.gov/olmstead/documents/georgia settle.pdf. The court was involved in the monitorship
to the extent that it entered the settlement agreement into the record of the case and it effectuated payments
to the monitor and served as an overseer of the monitor's efforts. However, the decision to enter the mon-
itorship was made without motion to the court or on the court's initiative. It was a part of settlement
negotiations between the DOJ and the state prior to any dispositive court proceeding on the merits of the
case.
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2007, two reporters at the Atlanta Journal-Constitution wrote a series of articles en-
titled "A Hidden Shame," highlighting the state's failures with regard to mental
health care.97 The series "revealed that dozens of patients at Georgia's psychiatric
hospitals had died from abuse, and that the state lagged in providing community-
based mental health treatment. '98 After these stories were publicized, Georgia cre-
ated a mental health agency, and the DOJ Civil Rights Division opened an investi-
gation and eventually brought a suit that resulted in a sweeping settlement agreement
in 2010.99 The settlement agreement required the retention of an "Independent Re-
viewer[]"-a modem-day monitor-that the DOJ and the state would jointly se-
lect.100 The monitor was charged with "conduct[ing] the factual investigation and
verification of data and documentation necessary to determine whether the state
[wa]s in compliance with the terms of' the Georgia Settlement. 101 Additionally, the
monitor was to evaluate the state's efforts to comply with the following, non-exhaus-
tive terms of the settlement agreement:
" cease admissions to state hospitals of all individuals whose reason for
"admission is due to a primary diagnosis of a developmental disability"; 0 2
* "move 150 individuals with developmental disabilities from" state hospitals
to community centers; 103
* provide familial support for "400 families of people with developmental
disabilities"; 104
" create "six mobile crisis teams for persons with developmental
disabilities";' 0 5 and
" develop "a program to educate judges and law enforcement officials about
community supports and services for individuals with developmental
disabilities and forensic status."' 0 6
In each of these Enforcement Monitorships,107 the remediation assistance took
the form of monitoring compliance with the government's stated requirements. Im-
portantly, these are activities each organization could have undertaken itself, but
needed an outsider to monitor because of the lack of trust stemming from its miscon-
duct. The outsider was necessary to assure that the organization was actually com-
mitted to reforming its past misconduct.
97. Alan Judd, Georgia Mental Health Talks Fail, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (July 1, 2010),
http://www.ajc.com/news/news/local/georgia-mental-health-talks-fail/nQhHC.
98. Id.
99. id.
100. Georgia, No. 1: 10-249, slip op. at 27.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 5.
103. Id. at6.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 9.
106. Id. at 10.
107. This includes the monitorship discussed in the 2010 Intel example from Part 1. See
2010 Intel, supra note 72.
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These examples demonstrate Enforcement Monitorships' discrete characteris-
tics. First, Enforcement Monitorships provide a service to the government or relevant
regulatory body by absorbing some of its oversight and enforcement functions. Sec-
ond, they provide a specific service to those that an organization's misconduct has
harmed by ensuring the firm's specific performance with remediation efforts. Third,
Enforcement Monitorships are charged primarily with monitoring compliance with
the relevant settlement agreement, but are also tasked with overseeing and, some-
times even implementing, the process necessary for making whole those that the or-
ganization's misconduct has injured. Fourth, organizations entering into Enforce-
ment Monitorships are typically reluctant to enter into a settlement agreement
initially, but after a significant amount of public awareness regarding the (i) scandal
and (ii) firm's reluctance to remedy harms resulting from the misconduct, it often
acquiesces and complies with the agreement's compulsory monitorship require-
ments.
B. Corporate Compliance Monitorships.
Corporate Compliance Monitorships are distinct from Traditional, Court-Or-
dered and Enforcement Monitorships, because the agreements between the organi-
zation and the government contemplate a different type of remediation effort. 08 Af-
ter the discovery of the firm's misconduct, an agreement is often reached between
the government and the corporation where the corporation consents to retain a mon-
itor. 10 9 In these instances, the organization's decision to enter into the monitorship
has more elements of organizational consent than in Traditional, Court-Ordered
Monitorships or Enforcement Monitorships. i t0 Unlike the Traditional, Court-Or-
dered or Enforcement Monitorships, the Corporate Compliance Monitor is not
108. See generally Root, supra note 8 (describing a remediation effort focused on con-
ducting a root-cause analysis and providing recommendations for improvement).
109. Id. Evidence of the ability of organizations to negotiate these types of monitorships
could be inferred by the changes surrounding their imposition in the past twenty or so months. The Fraud
Division at DOJ ("DOJ Fraud") entered into many Corporate Compliance Monitorships from 2004-2012,
but there has been a sharp decline in the past several months, with many companies allowed to resolve
FCPA violations without the imposition of a monitor. See 2014 FCPA and Related Enforcement Actions,
supra note 66. When a monitor has been contemplated from mid-2013 to present, organizations have been
permitted to retain a monitor for eighteen months and then engage in their own supervision for eighteen
months. See, e.g., Richard L. Cassin, Avon 'Reaches Understanding' to Pay $135 Million for FCPA Set-
tlement, FCPA BLOG (May 1, 2014, 10:08 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2014/5/I/avon-reaches-
understanding-to-pay-I 35-million-for-fcpa-settl.html. Traditionally, monitorships of this type were most
often engaged in for thirty-six months. See Warn, Diamant & Root, supra note 8, at 347. This shift could,
however, simply reflect a change in DOJ Fraud's enforcement priorities. In contrast, the Antitrust Division
at the DOJ ("DOJ Antitrust") is posturing as if it intends to ramp up its use of monitorships. In November
2014, post Apple-debacle, see infra Part II.C, DOJ Antitrust announced that it "reserve[s] the right to
insist on probation, including the use of [corporate] monitors, if doing so is necessary to ensure an effective
compliance program and to prevent recidivism." Mark L. Krotoski, DOJ Warning About Corporate Com-
pliance Programs, Probation and External Compliance Monitors, NAT'L L. REV. (Nov. 6, 2014),
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/doj-waming-about-corporate-compliance-prgrams-prbatin-
and-external-compliance-mo. Corporate probation is, however, a remedy limited to criminal enforcement
actions. See infra note 138.
110. Based on presentations I have given, I am aware that there are many who would
disagree with this assertion, although I do not believe I have seen a written critique to date. The general
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charged solely with monitoring compliance with specific judicial or governmental
demands. 11' The necessary remediation effort in these instances-which involves an
overhaul of the organization's corporate compliance program with respect to the area
of misconduct-is difficult for the government to delineate at the outset. 112 Instead,
the monitor is retained to engage in a sort of root-cause analysis. 113 Specifically, the
Corporate Compliance Monitor is "retained to investigate the compliance failure that
resulted in the legal or regulatory violation, assess the cause of the compliance fail-
ure, and analyze the company's unique business structures against the legal and reg-
ulatory requirements."' 14 The monitor is then responsible for delivering a set of rec-
ommendations that the organization should implement to ensure long-term legal and
regulatory compliance.' 15
For example, in 2012, HSBC Bank USA, N.A. ("HSBC") entered into a five-
year DPA with the federal government after, in addition to committing other legal
violations, HSBC failed "to maintain an effective anti-money laundering pro-
gram." 116 As part of the DPA, HSBC agreed to retain a government-approved mon-
itor with at least the following qualifications: (i) expertise in anti-money laundering
laws, (ii) "experience designing and/or reviewing corporate compliance policies,
procedures and internal controls," (iii) the ability to "access and deploy resources as
necessary to discharge the Monitor's duties," and (iv) "sufficient independence from
HSBC Holdings to ensure effective and impartial performance of the Monitor's du-
ties as described in the Agreement."' I7 The monitor was to provide periodic assess-
concern is that in any instance the corporation is compelled, at least to a certain extent, by concerns re-
garding aggressive governmental sanction due to the organizational misconduct. That intuition appears
correct, but the negotiating power of a company facing a monitor imposed by a court and a company
choosing to enter into a monitorship that will result in a Corporate Compliance Monitorship does appear
to be different and reflect a willingness for the corporation to have more direct involvement and control
over the monitorship process. See Root, supra note 8, at 540-46, 550-70.
111. Id. at 528. There is typically very little active court involvement in Corporate Com-
pliance Monitorships and, in fact, they are often entered into without ever consulting a court. There are
courts, however, that are actively challenging this practice. See 2014 Year-End Update on Corporate Non-
Prosecution Agreements (NPAs) and Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs), GIBSON, DUNN &
CRUTCHER LLP (Jan. 6, 2015), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2014-Year-End-Update-
Corporate-Non-Prosecution-Agreements-and-Deferred-Prosecution-Agreements.aspx [hereinafter Gib-
son Dunn, 2014 DPA/NPA] (discussing a district court judge's appointment of Professor Brandon Garrett
to "provide the Court with advocacy on questions regarding the scope of the Court's authority, if any, to
consider the fairness and reasonableness of a deferred prosecution agreement in deciding whether to ac-
cept or reject such an agreement").
112. Additionally, some would argue that it is inappropriate for the government to en-
gage in those sorts of dictates because they amount to suggesting corporate governance reform, an area in
which DOJ prosecutors often lack relevant expertise. Compare Lawrence A. Cunningham, Deferred Pros-
ecution and Corporate Governance: An Integrated Approach to Investigation and Reform, 66 FLA. L.
REV. 1 (2014) (noting literature that criticizes the ability of prosecutors to engage in effective corporate
governance reform efforts), with Brandon L. Garrett, Rehabilitating Corporations, 66 FLA. L. REV. F. I
(2014) (explaining that the problem is larger than prosecutors' expertise in corporate governance and sug-
gesting that corporate prosecutions should be overhauled).
113. Root, supra note 8, at 528.
114. Id. at 524-25.
115. Id.
116. Deferred Prosecution Agreement T1 1, 3, United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A.,
No. 12-763, (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 11,2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/hsbc/dpa-executed.pdf.
117. ld. 119.
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ments that make "recommendations reasonably designed to improve the effective-
ness of HSBC Group's program for ensuring compliance with the anti-money laun-
dering laws."'"18 In addition, the monitor was "encouraged to consult with HSBC
Holdings concerning his or her findings and recommendations on an ongoing basis,
and to consider and reflect HSBC Holdings' comments and input to the extent the
Monitor deem[ed] appropriate."' 19 In 2014, the conclusions of the monitor's first
scheduled report became public. The report indicated the "monitor's mixed assess-
ment" regarding HSBC's anti-money laundering programs. '20 Specifically, the mon-
itor noted his belief that the bank was committed to improving its anti-money laun-
dering efforts, but that the current systems in place at the bank lacked "integration,
coordination, and standardization."' 12 1 Thus, in this instance, the information the
monitor sent to outsiders was that the organization had not yet fully remediated the
underlying problems that resulted in the failure to comply properly with legal and
regulatory requirements.
Additionally, in 2014, Miron Construction Company, Inc. ("Miron") entered
into a non-prosecution agreement ("NPA") with the government regarding an inves-
tigation into "Miron's billing practices in Wisconsin public school construction pro-
jects" as well as "Miron's financial reporting practices in these and other construction
projects."' 122 Miron agreed to a variety of remedial efforts, including the retention of
a monitor.123 The monitor was responsible for reviewing and monitoring Miron's
compliance with the Agreement and making recommendations to Miron to assist
Miron's efforts to improve compliance and execute an effective Corporate Respon-
sibility Program. 124 The monitorship thus involved more than rote enforcement mon-
itoring. It required the monitor to work with Miron to develop long-term compliance
recommendations for the firm to adopt.
In Corporate Compliance Monitorships, the remediation efforts typically take
the form of assisting the organization and the government in determining the
changes, modifications, or additions the firm needs to make to its internal compliance
programs going forward to ensure improved future legal and regulatory compliance.
When a monitor conveys to third parties that the organization is successfully engaged
in effective remediation efforts, the organization benefits from the monitor's reputa-
tional capital. 125 The monitor provides information, in those instances, that reassures
118. Id. at Attachment B 4.
119. Id.
120. Rachel Louis Ensign & Max Colchester, U.S. Monitor Says HSBC Anti-Money
Laundering Systems Need Upgrade, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 1, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/news/arti-
cles/SB10001424052702304157204579475390409390188.
121. Id.
122. Press Release, U.S. Dep't Just., The Office of the United States Attorney Reaches
Settlement with Miron Construction Company, Inc. and Corporate Officers (Apr. 16, 2014),
http://www.justice.gov/usao/wie/news/2014/pr20140416_MironConstruction Co Settlement.html.
123. Letter from James L. Santelle, U.S. Att'y, E. Dist. of Wis., to Stephen Hurley,
Hurley, Burish, & Stanton, S.C., 5 (Feb. 14, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/usao/wie/news/2014/Down-
loads/Miron NPA.pdf.
124. Id. at 5.
125. There is a significant literature discussing the importance of reputational capital in
a variety of contexts. See, e.g., Kathryn Judge, Fee Effects, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1517 (2013) (discussing
importance of reputational capital for financial intermediaries); Alex Raskolnikov, The Cost of Norms:
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the public and the government that the organization is engaged in efforts that will
ensure similar misconduct does not reoccur.
The above examples demonstrate some of the common characteristics of Cor-
porate Compliance Monitorships. First, the monitorship is undertaken to provide a
service to the government and the corporation entering into the relevant agreement.
Second, the remediation effort undertaken in the Corporate Compliance Monitorship
encompasses more than monitoring compliance with the settlement agreement be-
tween the government and the corporation. This broader mandate is a necessity, as
one of the Corporate Compliance Monitorship's goals is to determine what changes
the corporation needs to implement to ensure its future compliance with legal and
regulatory requirements. Corporate Compliance Monitorships still engage in moni-
toring certain aspects of specific performance, but the primary goal of this type of
monitorship is to provide recommendations, to both the firm and the government,
meant to assist the corporation in its efforts to improve its legal and regulatory com-
pliance.126 They provide a service above and beyond specific performance, which
might be characterized as "specific performance plus." Third, the impetus to enter
the agreements comes from the government and the organization and is not the result
of a court order or extreme government coercion. That is not to suggest that the gov-
ernment has no power to push organizations into entering agreements that require
monitorships-it certainly does and each scenario is a bit different-but the Corpo-
rate Compliance Monitorship appears to have more elements of organizational con-
sent than Traditional, Court-Ordered Monitorships via FRCP 56(a)(1)(C) or Enforce-
ment Monitorships. The court is usually not involved or is only minimally involved
in the appointment of the monitor in Corporate Compliance Monitorships, and if the
monitorship arises as part of an NPA, there generally is no court involvement what-
soever.
127
C. Modern-Day, Court-Ordered Monitorships
The rise of the modem-day monitorship has influenced the manner in which
courts utilize monitors as court-appointed agents. Specifically, the increasing per-
missibility of outsourcing government enforcement activities to independent, private
outsiders may be giving current judges the perception that their ability to define the
scope of a monitorship is broader than legal authority permits. Additionally, the use
of modem-day monitorships in non-court-ordered, purely civil contexts may influ-
Tax Effects of Tacit Understandings, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 601, 671-73 (providing a discussion of reputa-
tional capital within economic theory).
126. Root, supra note 8, at 531.
127. The HSBC DPA is unique in that the district court approved the DPA, but "main-
tain[ed] supervisory power" and required the "government to file quarterly reports with the Court while
the case is pending." Mem. Op at *2, United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 12-763, 2013 WL 3306161
(E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013). Yet, even in that case, where the court took a more active interest in a Corporate
Compliance Monitorship, the decision-making regarding who would serve as the monitor and regarding
the monitor's responsibilities was determined solely between the corporation and the government. See
Douglas Gillison, HSBC Monitor Will be Ex-NY Ethics Chief Michael Cherkasky, Justice Department
Says, MAIN JUSTICE (June 5, 2013, 2:09 PM), http://www.mainjustice.com/2013/06/05/hsbc-monitor-
will-be-ex-ny-ethics-chief-michael-cherkasky-justice-department-says.
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ence governmental actors' requests that courts order the imposition of monitors. Fi-
nally, the current, general public (or lawyer-public) understanding of the role of the
modern-day monitorship may influence individuals who are serving as monitors in a
manner that leads them to believe their grant of authority as court-appointed agents
is greater in scope than is actually appropriate or legally permissible.
As explained in Part 1, federal courts have express authority to impose a monitor
under FRCP 53, but this authority is limited. Courts have, however, long been un-
derstood to have an inherent authority "to provide themselves with appropriate in-
struments required for the performance of their duties," which "includes authority to
appoint persons unconnected with the court to aid judges in the performance of spe-
cific judicial duties." '128 Despite these limitations on courts' authority to utilize inde-
pendent, private outsiders, after the corporate scandals of the early 2000s, courts have
sometimes taken a more aggressive approach in appointing monitors than what looks
to be appropriate or, in some instances, legally permissible. 129
In June 2002, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") filed a civil
action "charging major global communications provider WorldCom, Inc. with a mas-
sive accounting fraud totaling more than $3.8 billion."' 130 As part of the civil action,
the SEC requested the appointment of"a corporate monitor to ensure that documents
[we]re not destroyed and that no ... extraordinary payments [we]re made [to execu-
tives or WorldCom's affiliates].' 3 ' Two days later, WorldCom and the SEC entered
into a stipulated agreement that included the appointment of a monitor, who was
appointed less than a week later. 132 The initial grant of authority to the monitor
looked very similar to the authority typically extended to a Traditional, Court-Ap-
pointed Monitor. It was limited in scope, very explicit in delineating the specific
performance the monitor was meant to oversee, and consistent with the SEC's orig-
inal request to: (i) ensure evidence was not destroyed and (ii) "prevent the payment
of excessive executive compensation."' 133 Whether the monitor was appointed under
FRCP 53 or through the court's inherent authority to make such appointments, the
grant of authority did not look to be anomalous, particularly given WorldCom's con-
sent. Per FRCP 53(a)(1)(A), the federal courts are permitted to appoint monitors to
undertake actions stipulated to by the parties.
But in August 2002, the district court further explained the scope of the moni-
torship, in part to clarify how WorldCom's bankruptcy filing would impact the mon-
itorship. The court emphatically stated:
128. Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 21, at 1716 (quoting In re Peterson, 253 U.S.
300, 312 (1920)). Additionally, Sarbanes-Oxley contains a provision that authorized "the granting of'any
equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors."' O'Hare, supra note 21,
at 93 (citing Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(d)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78(u)(d)(5) (Supp. 112002)).
129. O'Hare, supra note 21, at 89.
130. Litigation Release No. 17588, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges WorldCom
with $3.8 Billion Fraud Commission Action Seeks Injunction, Money Penalties, Prohibitions on Destroy-
ing Documents and Making Extraordinary Payments to WorldCom Affiliates, and the Appointment of a
Corporate Monitor (June 27, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/Ir17588.htm.
131. Id.
132. Jonathan Bums, Former SEC Chairman Breeden Appointed WorldCom Monitor,
WALL ST. J. (July 3, 2002), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1025709085658152120; O'Hare, supra note
21, at 95.
133. O'Hare, supra note 21, at 95.
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To put it bluntly, it is the responsibility of the [m]onitor, among other responsibilities, to prevent
unnecessary compensatory expenditures by the company, not only in the form of looting by
miscreants but also in the form of excessive compensation of those who mistake a damaged
company for a broken piggybank.
To carry out his important functions, it is also vital that the [m]onitor be provided with all rele-
vant information, both from the company itself and from its outside advisors, committees,
agents, affiliates, and the like. The [m]onitor can hardly determine what is "necessary to the
operation of the business" if he is not provided with complete information about every aspect
of the business he deems relevant to his assessments.
134
Thus, while the scope of the monitor's work technically remained related to issues
of executive compensation, in practice the monitor's power increased exponentially
after this order. The monitor was able to demand access to virtually every decision
made at the company and, as such, was perceived both inside and outside the com-
pany as having very broad authority that went beyond ensuring document preserva-
tion and reasonable executive compensation. 3 5 Thus, the court-appointed agent uti-
lized in the WorldCom case did not look like a Traditional, Court-Ordered Monitor;
the role evolved to become something more.
WorldCom presents a classic chicken and egg problem. There was certainly an
enforcement shift in the early 2000s that contributed to the rise of the modem-day
monitorship.136 The backlash to corporate scandals resulted in the government pur-
suing new enforcement tools. 137 It is not clear whether the use of the modem-day
monitorship in other contexts (e.g., in Enforcement and Corporate Compliance Mon-
itorships) influenced the manner in which the court envisioned an appropriate grant
of authority for the WorldCom monitorship or vice versa. That said, WorldCom is a
bit of an anomaly because the company was in such dire straits post-scandal that it
consented to the Court-Ordered Monitorship and did not object when the court issued
its order describing a monitorship with extremely broad powers. 138 It is unclear
whether a strong defensive posture by WorldCom against the monitor's broad scope
of authority would have resulted in a different outcome.1 3 9 There is, however, a re-
cent example of a Court-Ordered Monitorship where the district court granted the
monitor extremely broad powers.
134. Mem. Order at 3, SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 02-CV-4963, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14201 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2002) (emphasis added).
135. See O'Hare, supra note 21, at 103-06.
136. Id. at 89.
137. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 112, at 14 (explaining that the number of DPAs
utilized since 2003 exploded when compared to their previous use).
138. Absent WorldCom's consent, I believe the court went too far, and that, if contested,
the monitorship should have been reined in for lack of appropriate legal basis to pursue such an aggressive
remedy. Under the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, there are parameters allowing a court to provide
a broad grant of authority like that found in WorldCom to a court-appointed agent, but that authority is
available for criminal actions. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8, intro. cmt. (2012); Root,
supra note 8, at 539 n.63. WorldCom arose out of a civil action. As noted by Professor Jennifer O'Hare,
there are real concerns about allowing a court-appointed agent, with no duties to shareholders, to make
sweeping corporate governance reforms, because there is no assurance that the agent is making decisions
in the best interests of shareholders. See O'Hare, supra note 2 1.
139. WorldCom was not in a position to take an aggressive posture. Its ability to weather
the scandal was, in part, related to its public commitment to reform. The monitor assisted WorldCom in
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In a 2013 civil antitrust case, Apple was found to have "colluded with five major
U.S. publishers to drive up the prices of e-books."' 4 ° In October 2013, the district
court appointed a monitor for a two-year term. 141 However, because Apple did not
consent to enter into the monitorship under FRCP 53(a)(l)(A), the court was limited
to appoint a monitor only to "address pretrial and posttrial matters that [could not]
be effectively and timely addressed by an available district judge or magistrate judge
of the district." 142 Per the terms of the court's order, the monitor's scope of authority
was to "review and evaluate Apple's existing internal antitrust compliance policies
and procedures" and "to recommend to Apple changes to address any perceived de-
ficiencies in those policies, procedures, and training."' 143 On its face, the order did
not necessarily look overly broad and would likely have survived scrutiny if chal-
lenged for failure to comply with FRCP 53(a)(1)(C). Indeed, after Apple lost its at-
tempt to stop the imposition of the monitorship, it did not initially appeal the impo-
sition of the Court-Ordered Monitorship. 144 But when the monitor actually developed
a monitorship work-plan under the court's order, it became apparent that the order
was susceptible to an interpretation that permitted the monitor to engage in activities
that were broader than Apple previously contemplated. 14
5
For example, Section V. of the court's final judgment outlines the responsibili-
ties given to a newly appointed "Antitrust Compliance Officer" within Apple. 146 That
judgment required the officer to engage in activities like communicating with Ap-
ple's Board of Directors and other leadership as well as ensuring that individuals
within Apple received comprehensive and effective annual training.' 47 The external
monitor was responsible for evaluating whether the internal Antitrust Compliance
Officer was properly effectuating his or her duties. Section VI.B. of the court's order
details the responsibilities of the "External Compliance Monitor" and states the mon-
itor "shall have the power to review and evaluate Apple's existing internal antitrust
compliance policies and procedures and the training program required by Section
VC. of this Final Judgment."' 48 Section V.C. required the Antitrust Compliance Of-
ficer to ensure that Apple's Board of Directors and other high level executives re-
ceived comprehensive and effective training on antitrust laws from an attorney with
these efforts by providing information to third-party outsiders about WorldCom's progress. As noted in
an article published after WorldCom successfully completed Chapter II bankruptcy, the appointment of
the monitor "helped reassure customers and regulators." Paul Davidson, WorldCom's Black Cloud About
to Lifi, USA TODAY (Apr. 18,2004), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/telecom/2004-04-
18-worldcom-reorganization x.htm.
140. Christopher M. Matthews, It's in the 'Public Interest'to Monitor Apple's Antitrust
Reforms, Judge Says, WALL ST. J. LAW BLOG (Jan. 16, 2014, 12:13 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/01/16/its-in-the-public-interest-to-monitor-apples-antitrust-reforms-
judge-says.
141. Mem. Op. at 10, United States v. Apple, Inc., No. 12:2826, 2013 WL 4774755
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2013) [hereinafter Apple Monitorship Court Order].
142. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(a)(1)(C).
143. See Apple Monitorship Court Order, supra note 141, at 11.
144. Roger Parloff, Who Won the Battle of the Apple Antitrust Monitor, FORTUNE (Feb.
11, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/02/1 I/who-won-the-battle-of-the-apple-antitrust-monitor.
145. United States v. Apple, 787 F.3d 131, 134, 140-41 (2d Cir. 2015).
146. See Apple Monitorship Court Order, supra note 141, 8-10.
147. id.
148. id. at II (emphasis added).
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relevant antitrust experience. 14 9 Thus, on its face, the court's order seemed to suggest
that the internal Antitrust Compliance Officer would oversee interactions regarding
potential antitrust concerns with senior Apple officials and the External Compliance
Monitor would, in turn, evaluate that Antitrust Compliance Officer's effectuation of
his or her duties in this regard. Additionally, the court's order, in Section VI.B.,
seemed to limit the External Compliance Monitor's scope of work to a review of
Apple's antitrust policies, procedures, and training and a responsibility to "recom-
mend to Apple changes to address any perceived deficiencies in those policies, pro-
cedures, and training."'5 0 Thus, the Court-Ordered Monitorship appeared to have a
limited scope of looking at Apple's existing antitrust policies-a narrow zone of in-
formation-and recommending changes based on "perceived deficiencies." The or-
der did not appear to authorize a vast cultural assessment. 151
But later, in Section VI.G., the order states:
Apple shall assist the External Compliance Monitor in performance of the responsibilities set
forth in this Section VI.... The External Compliance Monitor may, in connection with the ex-
ercise of his or her responsibilities under this Section VI, and on reasonable notice to Apple:
1. Interview, either informally or on the record, any Apple personnel, who may have counsel
present ....
One might read these provisions and assume that the External Compliance Monitor's
grant of authority to conduct interviews in Section VI.G. was limited by the scope
set out in Section VI.B., but one could also read the provisions more expansively to
permit the monitor to conduct direct interviews of any individual at Apple, even those
who were not engaged in activities related to Apple's alleged antitrust failures.
When the Court-Ordered Monitorship began, it appears the monitor took the
more expansive view of the activities that he was permitted to engage in under the
agreement. When the monitor began his work, he almost immediately began seeking
interviews with Apple's entire executive team and its entire board of directors. 152
The breadth of these inquiries reportedly surprised Apple, "since few of these offi-
cials had any direct involvement with antitrust compliance issues."' 53 This type of
149. Id at 8-9.
150. Id. at 11.
151. This narrow scope likely made sense, as Apple was also required to "designate a
person not [currently] employed by Apple ... to serve as Antitrust Compliance Officer, who shall report
to the Audit Committee or equivalent committee of Apple's Board of Directors and shall be responsible,
on a full-time basis until the expiration of [the Court's Final Judgment], for supervising Apple's antitrust
compliance efforts." Id. at 8. The wisdom of permitting courts and the government to develop corporate
governance reforms is an open question. See Cunningham, supra note 112, at 44-47. In other words, the
court's order, at DOJ request, also required Apple to install an internal antitrust gatekeeper. Thus, there
was already a court-appointed individual-although an individual who would become an internal, at least
on a temporary basis, employee-to engage in more robust development of a compliance program at Ap-
ple. The Antitrust Compliance Officer was charged with ensuring that employees "receive[d] comprehen-
sive and effective training annually on the meaning and requirements of... the antitrust laws" from "an
attorney with relevant experience in the field of antitrust law." Apple Monitorship Court Order, supra note
141, at 8-9. The Antitrust Compliance Officer was also supposed to work with the monitor in conducting
"annual antitrust compliance audit[s]." Id. at 9. Thus, the monitor's decision to engage in broad, sweeping
inquiry seems questionable, as he was already given a designated point of contact at the company respon-
sible for assisting the monitor in his efforts.
152. United States v. Apple, 787 F.3d 131, 140-41 (2d Cir. 2015).
153. Parloff, supra note 144.
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activity does not appear to be legally permissible under the textual terms of the
court's order. Apple argued that the monitor "stepped beyond the scope of his ap-
pointment." 154 The district court judge who appointed the monitor, however, de-
fended the monitor's broad scope of inquiry, stating she "believed that a permissible
part of his job was to scope out Apple's 'tone' and 'culture."" 55 The judge thereby
seemingly provided approval of the monitor's view that he needed to "'crawl inside
[the] company."'156
If Apple had entered into the monitorship voluntarily, as in a Corporate Compli-
ance Monitorship, these requirements likely would not have resulted in much con-
tention. For a Corporate Compliance Monitorship, where the monitor is charged with
conducting an individualized inquiry into the firm's needs, assessing its specific chal-
lenges, and providing organization-tailored recommendations for developing and
modifying the firm's compliance program,157 a "crawl inside the company" approach
may make sense. 158 An important component to developing a compliance program
is assessing the organization's culture. A key component of the Corporate Compli-
ance Monitorship is that the company works with the monitor, so that the monitor
can create a set of recommendations that are specifically tailored to the company and
that are aimed at improving the company's future legal and regulatory compliance.
But Apple did not agree to the monitorship. Indeed, Apple vigorously objected to the
imposition of the Monitor. 15
9
Resistance to the imposition of a court-appointed agent is unremarkable, and it
was evidenced in the above IBT and NYFD examples.' 60 But resistance when the
court-appointed agent's role is merely to monitor compliance with very specific court
orders and resistance when the court-appointed agent is charged with a broad grant
of discretion are two very different things.
It is important to remember that there are different levels of cooperation. If a
monitor is asked to observe a union election, that may require cooperation in the form
of permitting the monitor to be on site during the election and conduct random spot
checks of election procedures. Mandating access for a monitor is certainly something
that a court can effectively achieve via court order. If a monitor is asked to develop
new corporate governance protocols to ensure future legal and regulatory compli-
ance, that likely requires cooperation of a different sort. The cooperation level needed
is not limited to access. It requires organizational buy-in and, importantly, buy-in
from key employees at the monitored organization to ensure success. That type of
cooperation is difficult to mandate via court order, because if the key employees and
154. Matthews, supra note 140
155. Parloff, supra note 144.
156. Id.
157. See Root, supra note 8, at 550-54; supra Part ll.B.
158. Whether this approach is appropriate will depend on the scope of the monitorship
as agreed to by the government and the monitored organization and articulated in the corresponding set-
tlement agreement.
159. In part, Apple objected to the costs associated with the monitorship. The first two
weeks of work resulted in a bill of $138,432.40. Matthews, supra note 140; Martha Neil, 2nd Circuit Puts
Court-Appointed Monitor Back to Work in Apple e-Book Case But Limits His Duties, ABA J. (Feb. 11,
2014), http://www.abajoumal.com/news/article/2nd-circuit_putscourt-appointed-moni-
tor back to work in applee-bookcase .
160. See supra Part I.A.
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organization are resistant to change, it is unlikely that the monitor will be able to
glean all of the data necessary to develop effective recommendations. If organiza-
tional buy-in is not achieved, it is unlikely that a new culture of compliance will
actually result from the monitor's efforts.
In the case of Apple, the resistance to the court-appointed monitor resulted in a
variety of objections, including an objection regarding the monitor's authority to en-
gage in specific activities alleged to be outside the appropriate scope of the monitor-
ship. Apple's argument here may very well have been valid. Whether it is legally
permissible for a district court to grant a monitorship with this type of broad scope is
an open question, but a strict, textual reading of FRCP 53 suggests that the district
court's actions enlarged the scope of the monitor's activities beyond what is legally
permissible.' 6 1 On appeal, the Second Circuit "concluded that the [court's] order
'should be interpreted narrowly,' as simply allowing the monitor to 'assess the ap-
propriateness of the compliance programs adopted by Apple and the means used to
communicate those programs to its personnel.'162 Thus, the appellate court required
the monitorship to utilize a structure where the monitor took a role more akin to those
undertaken by traditional, court-appointed agents. There would have been no need
for the Second Circuit to rein in the monitorship if it had been within appropriate
bounds. Yet there technically has been no formal Second Circuit ruling invalidating
or prohibiting the use of Court-Ordered Monitorships where the monitor is provided
an extremely broad grant of authority without consent by all parties. 16
3
If, as the actions by the court and monitor in the case of Apple may suggest, the
realities of modem-day monitorships have changed the understanding that the public
(or the lawyer-public) has of the appropriate role of Court-Ordered Monitorships,
there may be subtle, legally-questionable changes occurring regarding their use. In-
stead of engaging in remediation efforts aimed at monitoring specific performance
with the courts' orders, Modem-Day, Court-Ordered Monitorships may be attempt-
ing to act more like consensually-created Corporate Compliance Monitorships with
"specific performance plus." Courts may be attempting to order a remediation effort
similar to what is found in Corporate Compliance Monitorships without fully realiz-
ing the nuances within the different types of monitorships and their corresponding
structural components.
The above examples suggest some common characteristics of the Modem-Day,
Court-Ordered Monitorship, which is, admittedly, a phenomenon in flux. First, the
monitorship is technically meant to provide a service to the court, and the monitor is
serving as an agent of the court. However, the monitor's deliverable is supposed to
result in a monitored organization with an improved compliance framework that will
ensure better regulatory and legal compliance. Thus, the monitorship does appear to
161. 1 believe that appointing a monitorship in this civil context, absent consent by both
parties, was an unlawful action by the district court, which merely serves to demonstrate the current com-
plexities with modem-day monitorships. This raises the question of whether FRCP 53 should be amended,
so that courts can appoint monitors with broad scopes of authority. I believe this would be a mistake,
because the kinds of corporate governance reforms that the court was attempting to achieve in the Apple
monitorship require organizational buy-in of a nature that would be difficult to mandate via court order.
162. Parloff, supra note 144.
163. United States v. Apple, 787 F.3d 131, 137-38 (2d Cir. 2015) (explaining that the
court was without appropriate jurisdiction to rule on the appropriateness of appointing a monitor in this
context).
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be providing a service-albeit a possibly unwanted service-to the monitored organ-
ization. Second, the remediation effort undertaken by the Modem-Day, Court-Or-
dered Monitorship surpasses ensuring specific performance with a court's detailed
order. Instead, the monitor is given a grant of authority that is broader in scope, leav-
ing a great deal more discretion with the monitor regarding the appropriate activities
s/he should engage in than what is found in Traditional, Court-Ordered Monitorships.
Third, the court initiates the monitorship, often at the government's strong request.
Additional time will likely be needed to fully assess Modem-Day, Court-Ordered
Monitorships, but, at a minimum, it does appear that the Modem-Day, Court-Ordered
Monitor is imbued with more inherent power and freedom to set its own agenda than
traditional, court-ordered agents, although the legality of such a monitorship remains
an open question.
D. Public Relations Monitorships
A more recent evolution on the monitorship spectrum may be an organization's
completely voluntarily retention of a monitor after misconduct is publicly uncovered.
During the Public Relations Monitorship, the monitor conducts an independent in-
vestigation into the scope of organizational wrongdoing and provides a public ac-
counting of the investigation, along with suggestions for remediation measures. Nev-
ertheless, no regulatory or governing body serves as a countervailing check on the
monitorship. The monitorship is meant to remediate the underlying organizational
misconduct, but it is also meant to heal the damaged relationship between the moni-
tored organization and the public through the monitorship's deliverable-the public
monitorship report. The public monitorship report also sends information-although
the reliability of the information is currently unclear-to applicable regulatory bod-
ies that there is no need to inflict aggressive or severe sanctions against the organi-
zation for the underlying misconduct.
This strategy of entering into a monitorship for the purpose of engaging in a fully
independent investigation appears to be a novel use of the modem-day monitorship.
In most instances, an organization would enter into an attorney-client relationship
with a lawyer who is retained to conduct a privileged, independent investigation.
After the investigation is concluded, the attorney sometimes releases his or her find-
ings in a public report, but the report was generated within the confines of an attor-
ney-client relationship. This approach allows the organization to provide the public
with the appearance of a genuine attempt at disclosure and future compliance, but
the organization maintains the ability to control the messaging and use of the attor-
ney's work product. This strategy was utilized in the investigation into Chris Chris-
tie's involvement in the Port Authority Scandal, 6 4 and it is an increasingly common
mechanism for attempting to assuage concerns regarding continued organizational
164. Report of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP Concerning Its Investigation on Behalf
of the Office of the Governor of New Jersey into Allegations Regarding the George Washington Bridge
Lane Realignment and Superstorm Sandy Aid to the City of Hoboken, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
35-38 (Mar. 26, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/nybridge0327.PDF (making no
explicit claim of actual independence from the Office of the Governor).
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misconduct (while technically maintaining organizational control over the infor-
mation disseminated to the public).'65 But those engaging in Public Relations Mon-
itorships do not enter into privileged relationships with the monitor at the outset.
They are novel precisely because the monitor has a purely independent mandate to
investigate the organization.
For example, in March 2011, allegations connecting Jerry Sandusky, a former
assistant football coach at Pennsylvania State University ("Penn State"), to sexual
abuse activities became known. Questions began to arise with regard to who at Penn
State had been aware of Sandusky's activities (and to what extent). 166 In the first few
weeks of November 2011, criminal charges were filed against Sandusky and several
high-ranking university officials, 67 prompting the university to take dramatic action
in response to the allegations. On November 21, 2011, the Penn State Board's Special
Investigation Task Force retained Louis Freeh, former director of the Federal Bureau
of Investigations, as Special Investigative Counsel. 168
Freeh initiated a comprehensive and thorough investigation and developed an
action plan for the university to adopt going forward. Freeh's 267-page report in-
cludes a section entitled "Independence of the Investigation," where he explains his
complete freedom to conduct an expansive investigation free from conflicts of inter-
est. 169 Freeh notes that "[n]o party interfered with, or attempted to influence, the
findings in this report. The Special Investigative Counsel revealed this report and the
findings herein to the Board of Trustees and the general public at the same time.' 70
The report's "most saddening finding... [wa]s the total and consistent disregard by
the most senior leaders at Penn State for the safety and welfare of Sandusky's child
victims."' 17 ' Thus, the report admits that individuals employed at Penn State were
engaged in egregious wrongdoing. The report goes on to explain that "[t]hese indi-
viduals, unchecked by the Board of Trustees that did not perform its oversight duties,
empowered Sandusky to attract potential victims to the campus and football events
by allowing him to have continued, unrestricted and unsupervised access to the Uni-
versity's facilities and affiliation with the University's prominent football pro-
gram." 172 Thus, the report strongly criticizes the very entity that retained the monitor,
thereby bolstering the impression of monitor independence. The report includes 120
recommendations developed by the monitor in eight areas aimed to prevent similar
165. See, e.g., Martin Bricketto, Gibson Dunn Subpoena Row Sends Warning on Firm
Probes, LAW360 (Oct. 9, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/712914/gibson-dunn-subpoena-row-
sends-warning-on-firm-probes (discussing dispute between Gibson Dunn and interested parties in the Port
Authority scandal regarding access to Gibson Dunn's "interview notes and metadata tied to about 430
pages of interview summaries").
166. Report of the Special Investigative Counsel Regarding the Actions of the Pennsyl-
vania State University Related to the Child Sexual Abuse Committed by Gerald A. Sandusky, FREEH
SPORKIN & SULLIVAN, LLP 8-9 (July 12, 2012), http://health-eq-
uity.pitt.edu/3956/1/REPORTFINAL 071212.pdf.
167. Id. at 13-14.
168. Id. at 8.
169. Id. at 11.
170. Id. at 12.
171. ld. at 14.
172. Id. at 15.
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misconduct at the university. 73 All 120 recommendations were made public in
Freeh's report, which is readily accessible via Penn State's website.1
74
The result of this completely voluntary and private Public Relations Monitorship
is that when the NCAA did officially impose a monitor for a five-year probationary
term, the new monitor deferred to many of Freeh's conclusions and credited Penn
State for adopting Freeh's recommendations. Specifically, the NCAA-appointed
monitor in the Penn State Monitorship refers to the Freeh Report repeatedly when
reporting on Penn State's progress. For example, the NCAA-appointed monitor's
second report stated that "Penn State also made significant strides toward completing
the implementation of the three most challenging long-term projects that were in-
cluded in the Freeh Report recommendations .... -175 Moreover, the monitor deter-
mined that Penn State was performing exceptionally well in its remediation efforts,
and stated that it will likely suggest ending the monitorship "substantially earlier than
scheduled."' 176 Indeed, in the NCAA-appointed monitor's third report, it went ahead
and "recommended that the monitorship conclude at the end of the 2015 calendar
year... a full twenty months before the end of the five-year term."'177 Therefore, it
appears that, by employing this Public Relations Monitorship, Penn State sidestepped
some of the penalties it otherwise would have faced as part of its discipline from the
NCAA for its failure to detect the misconduct.
General Motors's ("GM") response to a scandal related to a "defect in the igni-
tion switch of certain vehicles" provides another example of a private organization
utilizing the resources of a modem-day monitorship in a purely voluntary manner. 1
78
The defect caused the death or injury of an unknown number of individuals, prompt-
ing GM to set aside $400 to $600 million as part of a victim compensation effort. 179
GM voluntarily retained Kenneth Feinberg to administer the fund. '10 Feinberg had
previously served as the special master overseeing the distribution of the 9/11 com-
pensation funds, as well as "funds for victims of the BP oil spill, Boston Marathon
bombing and Virginia Tech campus shootings."'
8
'1
Like the parties in the Penn State example, GM and Feinberg took great pains to
demonstrate Feinberg's independence. As reported in the news, Feinberg stated that
"GM delegated to me full and sole discretion to decide which claims are eligible, and
173. Id. at 17.
174. Id. atch. 10.
175. Mitchell, supra note 89, at 6.
176. Id. at 7.
177. Press Release, DLA Piper, Monitor Announces Delivery of Third Annual Report
to Penn State, the NCAA, and the Big Ten Conference (Sept. 21, 2015),
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/news/2015/09/third-annual-report-to-penn-state.
178. Final Protocol for Compensation of Certain Death and Physical Injury Claims
Pertaining to the GM Ignition Switch Recall, GM IGNITION COMP. CLAIMS RESOLUTION FACILITY (June
30, 2014), http://www.gmignitioncompensa-
tion.com/does/FINAL%2OPROTOCOL%2OJune%2030%20%202014.pdf.
179. James R. Hood, 19 Death Claims Approved in GM Ignition-Switch Program,
CONSUMER AFF. (Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news/ I 9-death-claims-approved-in-
gm-ignition-switch-program-091 514.html.
180. James R. Healey, FeinbergAnnounces How GM Switch Victims Will Be Paid, USA
TODAY (June 30, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/20l4/06/30/feinberg-gm-switch-
compensation/1 1718321.
181. Id.
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how much money they should get. There are no appeals (by GM or victims)." 1 82
Additionally, Feinberg created a website to allow individuals to file claims. The
homepage of the website makes the following points:
Mr. Feinberg retains complete and sole discretion over all compensation awards to eligible
victims, including eligibility to participate in the Program and the amounts awarded. By
agreement, GM cannot reject the Administrator's final determinations as to eligibility and
amount of compensation.
The Program has no aggregate cap; GM has agreed to pay whatever the Administrator
deems appropriate in each and every individual case. 
18 3
Thus, similar to the Penn State example, GM placed the authority of all remediation
efforts-in this case the administration of victim compensation-in the hands of an
independent, private outsider or a modem-day monitor. This particular Public Rela-
tions Monitorship looks more like an Enforcement Monitorship than a Corporate
Compliance Monitorship, as Feinberg was not engaged to assist the corporation in
developing policies and procedures for reform. Instead, he, like the National Mort-
gage Settlement monitor, was engaged for the purpose of overseeing a monitorship
with the sole remediation goal of providing compensation to victims of the underly-
ing organizational misconduct.
The effect of GM's use of the Public Relations Monitorship, in conjunction with
other remedial activities, 184 is that when GM ultimately received a formal sanction
from the government via DPA, it was much less severe than it likely would have
been without those efforts. For example, the government credited GM for providing
"extraordinary cooperation" during the federal government's investigation into the
scandal. 85 As a result, the monetary fine GM received was "25 percent less than the
record $1.2 billion Toyota" settlement from 2014. 186 Additionally, if GM adheres to
the DPA, the company "can have its record wiped clean."18 7 The GM settlement does
require the appointment of a monitor,1 88 but the reaction of many is that GM's sanc-
tion was not as severe as was expected given the nature and scope of the miscon-
duct. 89
182. Id.
183. GM IGNITION COMP. CLAIMS RESOLUTION FACILITY, http://www.gmignitioncom-
pensation.com (last visited Feb. 25, 2015).
184. GM engaged in a variety of efforts to address the misconduct related to the ignition
switch failure. For example, GM's chief executive officer testified before Congress and apologized for
the failure. See Bill Vlasic & Aaron M. Kessler, At Hearing on G.M. Recall, Mary Barra Gives Little
Ground, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/18/business/senate-hearing-on-
general-motors.html.
185. Id.
186. Danielle Ivory & Bill Vlasic, $900 Million Penalty for G.M's Deadly Defect
Leaves Many Cold, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/18/business/gm-to-
pay-us-900-million-over-ignition-switch-flaw.html.
187. Id.
188. Nate Raymond, Federal Monitorfor GM Appointed in Settlement, REUTERS (Oct.
29, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/29/us-usa-gm-monitor-
idUSKCNOSN2WU20151029#g7AhMdolct3TR7RO.97.
189. Mike Spector & Christopher M. Matthews, U.S. Charges GM with Wire Fraud,
Concealing Facts on Ignition Switch, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-
charges-gm-with-wire-fraud-concealing-facts-on-ignition-switch-1 442502075.
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These examples suggest that the Public Relations Monitorship also has common
characteristics. First, the monitorship is undertaken to provide what is presented as a
service to the public. The organization, due to the extreme nature of the underlying
scandal, has lost public trust, and the monitorship is a mechanism to assure the public
that the organization will completely and thoroughly remediate the harm caused. But
the monitorship also provides a valuable service to the organization. It allows the
organization to borrow the reputational capital of the monitor. It is no accident that
the people appointed to oversee the monitorships in the above two examples were
well-known individuals with impeccable reputations. The word of these individuals
carries with it a legitimacy and gravitas that the organizations desperately need to
assist in restoring the trust of the public.
Second, the remediation effort undertaken in the Public Relations Monitorship
is a completely voluntary process on the part of the monitored organization. Stressing
the "voluntary" nature of this monitorship type is not meant to suggest that there are
not powerful external forces motivating the embroiled organization to enter into the
Public Relations Monitorship. Indeed, in both the Penn State and GM examples, for-
mal sanctions were certainly looming on the horizon. Yet the actual decision to enter
into the Public Relations Monitorship was done at the organization's own initiative
without a formal decree or request from a third party like a court, governmental
agency, or self-regulatory organization. Instead, the organization borrows a remedi-
ation model that the government has previously used and privatizes it. Third, the
organization initiates the monitorship, but then completely steps back and distances
itself from the monitorship process for fear of tainting the results of the remediation
effort.
It is likely too early to pass judgment on the privatization of monitorships. None-
theless, there are potential concerns. For example, there is no entity serving as a
check on the monitor's actions like in Court-Ordered, Enforcement or Corporate
Compliance Monitorships. The monitor's interest in his own reputation appears to
be the only factor in place to ensure that the monitorship is genuinely undertaken in
a purely independent manner. Additionally, privatizing monitorships may delegiti-
mize other forms of monitorships. There are, however, possible benefits. The use of
monitorships is a reaction to failed organizational self-policing. If organizations can
engage in efforts to effectively address this failure on their own, these private efforts
could lessen burdens on regulatory bodies. Public Relations Monitorships also pro-
vide a tangible service to the public, as they allow for remediation efforts to be com-
pleted in a manner that has strong organizational buy-in, which could result in long-
term and systematic change within the organization. Regardless, the use of Public
Relations Monitorships is a new phenomenon that requires careful observation and
further study.
Monitorships can take a variety of forms, but this diversity is related directly to
the remediation effort the monitorship is intended to achieve. The above categoriza-
tion is by no means exhaustive. Yet these examples do demonstrate that monitorships
are evolving. Without this type of analysis, it could be difficult to detect the changes
occurring within Court-Ordered Monitorships. It could also be difficult to appreciate
the potential of monitorship privatization as a remediation tool. More importantly,
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this categorization serves as a frame within which commonly proposed monitorship
reforms can be placed to see whether they can be effectively and practically applied
in a universal manner. Part III begins this effort.
Il1. The Differences Matter.
As demonstrated in Parts I and II, modem-day monitorships are widely used by
courts, regulators, prosecutors, and private organizations. Yet there are no formal
standards of conduct or rules governing monitorships. Courts and scholars have ex-
pressed concern about this lack of formal oversight and guidance.' 90 And the need
for a set of standards has been widely recognized. Indeed, there have been unsuc-
cessful attempts for reform by policymakers. 191 For example, in 2008 and 2009,
around the same time as DOJ guidance was provided to prosecutors outlining the
appropriate use of monitorships, 192 two bills were put forward in the House of Rep-
resentatives aimed at regulating monitor assignments, 193 but these efforts stalled. No
new bills have since been introduced. Additionally, in 2012, the American Bar As-
sociation launched a task force charged with setting standards for corporate monitors,
which resulted in the publication of a broad set of standards in August 2015, but an
effort to provide commentary on the published standards remains ongoing. 194 Thus,
the status quo continues: monitorships are heavily relied upon as important overseers
of organizations' remediation efforts, while modem-day monitorships themselves
lack a technical source of legal authority governing their use.
This Part establishes the difficulty with attempting to adopt universal rules
meant to govern all monitorships. As examples, this Part briefly addresses three is-
sues that scholars and policymakers often reference-the appropriateness of court
involvement, the need for confidentiality, and the monitor's responsibilities toward
the parties involved in the monitorship-to demonstrate that once monitorships are
understood as heterogeneous remediation tools, it becomes more difficult to make
broad-based claims regarding norms that should govern all monitorships. 95 The Part
demonstrates that the analysis for each of the proposed reforms varies depending
190. See Gibson Dunn, 2014 DPA/NPA, supra note 111 (discussing a court's ruling
addressing issues of confidentiality related to monitors' work product); GARRErr, supra note 21, at 176-
77, 192 (discussing the benefits ofjudicial involvement in overseeing corporate monitors); Peter J. Hen-
ning, When Judges Refuse to Be Rubber Stamps, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Mar. 22, 2010, 12:33 PM)
(discussing an instance where a district court judge questioned aspects of a monitorship during a plea
hearing), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/03/22/when-judges-refuse-to-be-rubber-stamps.
191. The DOJ has provided guidance to prosecutors on when monitors should be ap-
pointed and what kind of responsibilities might be appropriate for monitors to have, but that guidance
primarily provided a restraint and check on prosecutors (and not on monitors directly). Khanna, supra
note 21, at 238-240.
192. Morford, supra note 29.
193. Id. (discussing Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act of 2009, H.R. 1947,
111 th Cong. (2009); Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act of 2008, H.R. 6492, 1 10th Cong. (2008)).
194. Monitors, A.B.A. (Aug. 2015), http://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminaljus-
tice/standards/MonitorsStandardsFourthEdition-TableofContents.html.
195. The new ABA monitor standards do not definitively address these issues. Id. The
standards do briefly discuss confidentiality, but do not address when confidentiality should occur or dis-
cuss factors that should be considered by the parties when deciding whether confidentiality should apply
to the monitor's work product. Id. at Standard 24-4.3.
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upon the type of monitorship assessed. This conclusion supports the argument that
differences amongst monitorships matter and should be taken into account by schol-
ars assessing monitorships and policymakers considering monitorship reform.
A. Court Oversight
One of the most common suggestions for reforming monitorships is to establish
more robust court oversight. 196 There are legitimate concerns that, when modem-day
monitorships are conducted without active court involvement, they operate without
sufficient oversight to protect the interests of the public. 197 This Part discusses the
potential impact of court involvement on each of the monitorship categories identi-
fied in Parts I and II. To frame this inquiry, this Part questions whether robust court
oversight appears likely to be a benefit or detriment to the particular remediation
effort the monitorship is charged with achieving-whether it is likely to assist in
effectuating the remediation effort being sought. A court could assist the remediation
effort by increasing the likelihood of long-term future and regulatory compliance,
but the court could also diminish the remediation effort by taking actions that may in
fact be harmful to the organization's compliance efforts.
1. Traditional, Court-Ordered Monitorships
There are possible benefits to allowing courts to have an active role in monitor-
ship oversight. In the examples of Traditional, Court-Ordered Monitorships, the or-
ganizations engaged in misconduct vigorously objected to the imposition of a moni-
torship. 198 In part, these objections were the result of a more general view on the part
of the organizations that they had not engaged in inappropriate conduct deserving of
punishment. If an organization is unwilling to take responsibility for the wrongdoing
it engaged in, it would seem sensible and necessary to find a mechanism to oversee
the remediation efforts required to address the underlying harm. Due to the reticent
nature of the organization, it may be helpful for the monitor to be able to return to
the court if the organization fails to comply with the court's order. The court's au-
thority to levy mandates and issue sanctions might encourage the organization to
fully address its history of misconduct.
The danger, however, in mandating compliance without voluntary organiza-
tional participation and buy-in is that it can result in less ethical behavior overall
within the organization. As other scholarship has noted, "[a]ggressive compliance
monitoring can have an unfavorable effect on the motivation of agents to comply
with rules." 199 Behavioral ethics literature demonstrates that, when individuals are
told to comply with rules for the sake of compliance instead of for the sake of acting
196. GARRETr, supra note 21, at 176-77, 192; Garrett, supra note 112, at 2-3; Alison
Frankel, DOJ Should End Secret Selection Process for Corporate Watchdogs, REUTERS (July 14, 2014),
http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2014/07/14/doj-should-end-secret-selection-process-for-corpo-
rate-watchdogs (discussing the importance of judicial oversight in the imposition of corporate monitors).
197. GARRETT, supra note 21, at 176-77, 192; Garrett, supra note 112, at 2-3.
198. See supra Part I.A.
199. Milton C. Regan, Jr., Risky Business, 94 GEO. L.J. 1957, 1970 (2006).
Yale Journal on Regulation
ethically, it can actually diminish ethical behavior within firmS. 20 0 Thus, aggressive
mandates from courts requiring monitorships may address the immediate concerns
of the court's order, but they also may have the unintended consequence of decreas-
ing overall ethical behavior within the organization. Yet given the resistance that
commonly results in and is associated with Traditional, Court-Ordered Monitorships,
it may be worth risking the harms associated with mandating compliance in favor of
empowering courts to provide the necessary incentives to the monitored organization
to encourage it to properly engage in remediation efforts.
2. Enforcement Monitorships
Enforcement Monitorships might also benefit from court oversight. As explained
in Part II, the goal of an Enforcement Monitorship is to ensure the organization's
specific performance with the agreement's requirements. 20 1 The scope of the En-
forcement Monitorship is often quite narrow, which would make it relatively easy
for a court to assess whether the monitored organization is in compliance with the
agreement. Thus, allowing court oversight could assist the monitorship's objectives
by providing another incentive for the organization to comply with the settlement
agreement with the government and with the monitor's requests and dictates. Yet it
has not been established that a court is needed to ensure specific performance. In a
well-functioning Enforcement Monitorship, the organization's failure to comply
with the monitorship's parameters would result in the monitor alerting the govern-
ment. The government would be free to file a formal action, civil or criminal, in
response to the organization's noncompliance. Thus, there is a mechanism in place
to incentivize compliance. This available consequence for noncompliance does not,
however, satisfy concerns regarding the potential "capture" of regulatory entities or
monitors by monitored organizations.
Capture here "refers to the development of an extremely close relationship be-
tween" the monitored organization and the regulator or monitor. 20 2 Scholars have
expressed concern that such a close relationship could lead to sympathy from the
regulator or monitor toward the organization that engaged in misconduct as well as
"lax enforcement.- 20 3 Allowing courts to directly oversee monitorships could be ben-
eficial, because they could provide an additional check on the conduct of both the
government and the monitor, thereby deterring occurrences of capture. If the govern-
ment or monitor were not taking an appropriately aggressive stance in monitoring
the organization's remediation efforts, the court could correct this deficiency.
Concerns regarding the possible effects of capture on monitorships, however,
have yet to be proven. While a certain level of monitorship capture likely exists, the
scope and breadth of the problem are currently an unknown. Indeed, there are exam-
200. BAZERMAN & TENBRUNSEL, supra note 31, at 103-08.
201. See supra Part 11.A.
202. Root, supra note 8, at 579 (quoting Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, The Benefits of Cap-
ture, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 569, 570 (2012)).
203. Id.
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pies of (i) monitors providing negative information regarding an organization's re-
mediation efforts20 4 and (ii) regulators expressing displeasure with the results of a
monitorship. 215 Without empirical evidence demonstrating the extent of the threat of
capture to effective monitorships-a question that would benefit from future study
and is likely equally relevant to assessments of both Enforcement and Corporate
Compliance Monitorships-it may be premature to adopt a rule requiring active
court oversight of all monitorships entered into as a result of agreements between
organizations and the government settling instances of firm misconduct.
There are potential detriments associated with robust court oversight of moni-
torships. First, as is mentioned in Part III.A.l., court oversight could diminish the
development of a positive corporate culture that results in ethical behavior, because
mandating compliance with particular norms can diminish personal motivations to
act ethically.20 6 Allowing for voluntary Enforcement Monitorships without robust
court oversight would allow private actors to maintain accountability for their ac-
tions, albeit with the check of governmental presence. Second, a current benefit of
monitorships is that they "shift the costs of enforcement from the government and
the public to" the organization that engaged in wrongdoing, because the organization
is typically responsible for compensating the monitor. 2 7 Requiring more active court
involvement will shift some of those cost savings back to the public via court costs.
The shift thereby eliminates one of the benefits associated with outsourcing oversight
activities to monitors.
3. Corporate Compliance Monitorships
The benefits of court oversight for Corporate Compliance Monitorships are
more opaque than those for Traditional, Court-Ordered and Enforcement Monitor-
ships. The Corporate Compliance Monitorship's scope is less concrete, as the deliv-
erable is often a set of recommendations for the organization to adopt that are devel-
oped after the monitor works with the monitored organization to engage in a "root-
cause analysis." 20 8 Thus, there would likely be greater difficulty for a court to assess
successfully the Corporate Compliance Monitorship's effectiveness than when the
monitor is engaged in simply ensuring specific performance.
The voluntary nature of the agreement produces additional differences, as the
monitored organization in the Corporate Compliance Monitorship has little insight
at the outset of the monitorship into the types of recommendations the monitor will
develop. Thus, the organization's voluntary agreement is obtained despite the organ-
ization's relatively unclear understanding of the remediation efforts that will become
necessary as a result of the monitorship. The government or regulatory body almost
certainly has a persuasive, or possibly even coercive, influence over the organiza-
tion's decision-making, but the organization voluntarily agreed to enter into a moni-
torship in a manner that necessarily required a higher level of organizational buy-in
204. See Ensign & Colchester, supra note 120 (discussing the monitor's mixed assess-
ment of HSBC's remediation efforts).
205. See, e.g., Hamilton & Hopkins, supra note 12.
206. See BAZERMAN & TENBRUNSEL, supra note 31, at 103-07.
207. Root, supra note 8, at 525; Khanna, supra note 21, at 241.
208. Root, supra note 8, at 531.
Yale Journal on Regulation
than what would typically be needed in, say, an Enforcement Monitorship. This
higher level of organization buy-in may suggest a diminished need for court involve-
ment, as the firm appears committed to engage in reform efforts. Moreover, a firm
involved in a Corporate Compliance Monitorship is often charged with transforming
a "culture of corruption" into a "culture of compliance." 20 9 The importance of creat-
ing a culture of compliance is well-documented, 210 but the ability of the monitorship
to assist in the creation of this culture could be harmed by overly aggressive court-
involvement.
There are some concrete detriments associated with allowing heightened court-
involvement for Corporate Compliance Monitorships. First, and most importantly,
court proceedings are often subject to heightened public disclosure norms, which
could deter organizations from entering into Corporate Compliance Monitorships. 211
Second, and as noted in the above discussion of Enforcement Monitorships, if the
organization is serious about working with the monitor and the government to de-
velop a plan that will allow the organization to avoid similar misconduct in the future,
the presence of the court might serve to increase the costs of enforcement without
providing a clear tangible benefit.
4. Modem-Day, Court-Ordered Monitorships
The benefits of Traditional, Court-Ordered Monitorships are applicable to Mod-
em-Day, Court-Ordered Monitorships. In an environment where a firm fails to accept
responsibility for organizational misconduct, it would seem appropriate for the court
that oversaw the formal determination of organizational misconduct to also maintain
oversight of the organization's use of a monitorship as a court-ordered remediation
tool.
The dangers associated with mandating compliance versus achieving organiza-
tional participation and buy-in are also present. These concerns are, however, likely
more pronounced when dealing with Modem-Day, Court-Ordered Monitorships.
Modem-Day, Court-Ordered Monitorships are often interpreted by the monitor as
granting the monitor a large amount of leeway in his activities.2 12 For example, one
criticism levied at the WorldCom Monitorship related to the monitor's power to "in-
terfere with the ability of the board and corporate officers to manage the com-
pany. '2 13 When Modem-Day, Court-Ordered Monitors take an expansive view of
their authority, they may diminish employees' individual beliefs that they should act
ethically because it is the right course of action. In fact, an aggressive monitorship
that dictates actions for executives and other organizational members may lead to
209. Warin, Diamant & Root, supra note 8, at 326, 337-41.
210. Id.
211. See Root, supra note 8, at 546-48 (discussing a monitorship involving AIG and a
reporter's claim that because the monitorship was approved by a court, the monitor's reports were public
records that were required to be disclosed to third parties); see also Gibson Dunn, 2014 DPA/NPA, supra
note 111, at 8 (arguing for the importance of"preserving the confidentiality of monitor work product and
independent third-party monitors as a feature of the DPA and NPA landscape" and stating that "if such
confidentiality is significantly undermined, monitorships as a facet of corporate enforcement action reso-
lution will likely become less attractive to the government and corporations").
212. See supra Part I1.C.
213. O'Hare, supranote21,at 103.
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their abdication of responsibility for their actions. Behavioral ethics research cau-
tions against this approach:
[Mandated] goals can create systematic problems. Specifically, they can encourage employees
to 1. focus too narrowly on their goals, to the neglect of nongoal areas; 2. engage in risky be-
havior; 3. focus on extrinsic motivators and lose their intrinsic motivation- 4 and, most im-
portantly.. ., engage in more unethical behavior than they would otherwise. 
14
If, for example, an aggressive Modem-Day, Court-Ordered Monitor requires an
executive to meet the particular goal of conducting expansive antitrust compliance
training within the employee workforce, it could backfire. The executive may focus
on ensuring everyone at the company receives general antitrust training. That would
be in line with the monitor's direction, but it might be that a more targeted, in-depth
training with a subset of employees likely to deal with antitrust issues would be a
more effective work-plan. Additionally, the executive might focus on training and
look past questions that could alert the executive to antitrust misconduct within the
organization. Instead of viewing herself as a gatekeeper who could detect misconduct
during training, the executive might view herself narrowly as a gatekeeper engaged
in a preventative function by providing training.
Additionally, a Modem-Day, Court-Ordered Monitorship's ability to remediate
organizational misconduct could be stifled by a court's or a monitor's imposition of
unwise corporate governance reforms. 215 Such a court or monitor may lack signifi-
cant corporate governance expertise. A set of remediation efforts might look to be
quite sensible on paper, but may be challenging in practice. For example, a not un-
common provision in settlements for claims of unfair competition requires annual
training of all employees and agents of the organization involved in misconduct. 216
It may be appropriate for a monitor or court to require the monitored organization to
undertake this type of remediation effort, but it also may be practically unreasonable
depending upon the size of the organization and the relevant connection between
employees and the likelihood that they may be engaged in conduct that might give
rise to antitrust concerns. An expert in organizational behavior and corporate gov-
emance may readily see this type of nuance, which may not be as obvious to a mon-
itor or court without similar expertise.
5. Public Relations Monitorships
In the most extreme example, it does not appear that robust court oversight for
Public Relations Monitorships would be appropriate, as these monitorships are em-
ployed on a completely voluntary basis. Mechanisms for determining the reliability
of these types of monitorships are probably needed, but it does not appear, at this
214. BAZERMAN & TENBRUNSEL, supra note 31, at 104.
215. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 112 (discussing the wisdom of permitting cor-
porate outsiders, like prosecutors, to develop corporate governance reforms and questioning the efficacy
of the phenomenon).
216. See Decision and Order, In re Nat'l Ass'n of Music Merchs., Inc., Docket No. C-
4255, 2009 WL 1102975 (F.T.C. Apr. 8, 2009).
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time, that this effort should occur in a judicial setting. There will likely be other op-
portunities for formal governmental and judicial interventions if the underlying or-
ganizational misconduct warrants such actions.
B. Transparency and Confidentiality Norms
Another common concern regarding the use of monitorships, which is related to
the arguments in favor of robust court oversight, involves the appropriate rules for
disclosing monitorships' processes and findings. Attempts to obtain information
about monitorships and monitors' work product have proven difficult. 2 17 This diffi-
culty has led to a struggle between some scholars and reporters, who advocate in
favor of greater public access to information regarding monitorships, 218 and monitors
and practitioners, who assert a need for binding confidentiality in monitorship rela-
tionships. 2 9 To assess this issue, this Section focuses on whether adopting certain
norms regarding confidentiality or transparency would be likely to assist the moni-
torship in achieving its stated remediation goals. The monitorships described in this
Article appear to fall into one of two categories: monitorships that would likely ben-
efit from (i) high levels of transparency with low confidentiality protections and (ii)
low levels of transparency paired with high confidentiality protections.
1. High Transparency & Low Confidentiality
Court-Ordered Monitorships. There is little practical wiggle room when consid-
ering issues of transparency and confidentiality for Court-Ordered Monitorships.
Both Traditional and Modem-Day, Court-Ordered Monitorships are likely subject to
the same transparency and confidentiality norms and procedures that govern court
proceedings generally. The status quo errs on the side of public disclosure, as these
monitorships are an outgrowth of what is often a very public court proceeding with
active court involvement in determinations of organizational misconduct.220 If the
Court-Ordered Monitor's work product qualifies as ajudicial record, it will normally
be deemed a document that must be made accessible to the public.2 21 As with any
court matter, sensitive documents detailing personally identifying information or
217. GARRETT, supra note 21, at 177 (explaining that the government has in some in-
stances refused to disclose even the identity of the monitor).
218. See 10OReporters, LLC v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, No. 14-CV-1264-RC, 2014 WL
6817009, at *4 (D.D.C. Dec. 3, 2014) (arising out of a not-for-profit news media organization's FOIA
request for all documents authored or submitted by a monitor to the government); GARRETT, supra note
21, at 176-78; Root, supra note 8, at 546-48 (citing SEC v. Am. Int'l Grp., 854 F. Supp. 2d 75, 77-78
(D.D.C. 2012) (discussing an attempt by a reporter to gain access to a monitor's reports to the govern-
ment)).
219. Gibson Dunn, 2014 DPA/NPA, supra note I 11, at 5 ("With [the monitor's] unfet-
tered access to sensitive and confidential company information, companies understandably want to pre-
serve the confidentiality of the monitor's reports and other communications to the government.").
220. Compare SEC v. Am. Int'l Grp., 854 F. Supp. 2d 75, 77-78 (D.D.C. 2012) (grant-
ing release of redacted monitorship reports on the basis of them being judicial records), with SEC v. Am.
Int'l Grp., 712 F.3d 1, 3-4 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (reversing the district court and finding the reports were "not
judicial records subject to the right of access because the district court made no decisions about them or
that otherwise relied on them" (emphasis added)).
221. Am. Int'l Grp., 712 F.3d at 4.
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highly confidential information like a trade secret can (and should) be sealed from
the public, but most of the information associated with the Court-Ordered Monitor-
ship will likely remain publicly accessible.
The high transparency and low confidentiality associated with Court-Ordered
Monitorships, however, may explain some of the organizational reluctance to enter
into Modem-Day, Court-Ordered Monitorships. If an organization is concerned that
robust access to its business operations could lead to third-party civil litigation, a
means of private enforcement,2 22 it may try to minimize its exposure by attempting
to avoid a monitorship with high levels of transparency and low confidentiality.
Transparency concerns are likely very important for companies facing Modem-Day,
Court-Ordered Monitorships, because the monitors in these instances appear to ob-
tain larger pools of data and provide more expansive assessments. That information,
if made public, could potentially put the monitored organization at risk for related,
subsequent civil litigation. These concerns may not, however, be particularly im-
portant for companies undergoing a Traditional, Court-Ordered Monitorship, be-
cause the monitor is engaged in an effort to confirm the organization's specific per-
formance with the court's orders. Indeed, Traditional, Court-Ordered Monitorships
may benefit from a public accounting of the monitor's findings, because the individ-
uals that the organization harmed likely need information about the monitorship pro-
cess.
Enforcement Monitorships. Enforcement Monitorships look relatively similar to
Traditional, Court-Ordered Monitorships. The monitorship is charged primarily with
confirming the monitored organization's specific performance with what is often a
public and very detailed settlement agreement. Thus, the monitor's reports discuss-
ing the status of the monitorship should generally be relatively narrow in scope and
explain whether the monitored organization has or has not complied with the specific
settlement terms. A public reporting of this information could assist the monitorship
in achieving its stated remediation goals, because, again, it would allow individuals
that the organization harmed to receive information regarding the status of remedia-
tion efforts. As a result, the monitored organization appears to have little interest in
obtaining confidentiality protections with respect to the monitor's work. Similar to
court proceedings, the specific remediation that particular harmed individuals receive
should likely remain confidential.
For example, the National Mortgage Settlement monitorship required banks to
provide financial remediation to homeowners who were subject to improper foreclo-
sure proceedings. 2 3 The monitor publicly detailed his efforts and the requirements
222. David Freeman Engstrom, Private Enforcement's Pathways: Lessons from Qui
Tam Litigation, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1913, 1919 (2014). Engstrom explains two competing accounts re-
garding the use of private enforcement: "The standard account sees profit-driven private enforcement as
a mechanistic and manipulatable engine of regulatory output that frictionlessly adapts to shifts in litigation
incentives (such as available damages or attorneys' fees) and also the amount of misconduct, thus picking
up slack for regulatory failures elsewhere in the system. A more jaundiced account, by contrast, sees
private enforcement as contingent, not mechanistic, and prone to chronic information failures that cause
litigation activity to lurch from socially inefficient 'explosions' to equally costly 'droughts.' Profit-seek-
ing private enforcers, runs this alternative view, will also relentlessly push into legal interstices, exploiting
statutory and regulatory ambiguities in suits against much or all of an industry rather than targeting the
patently illegal conduct of a few malefactors." Id. at 1921-22.
223. See supra Part II.A.
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homeowners needed to fulfill to obtain financial remediation. This public accounting
of the monitor's work was an important component of his ability to achieve the mon-
itorship's stated remediation goals. A homeowner's individual financial information
related to a mortgage remained outside of the public sphere, but the remediation in-
formation reported in the aggregate was made available for public disclosure and
provided information to third parties about whether the banks had successfully en-
gaged in the necessary remediation efforts.
Public Relations Monitorships. Public Relations Monitorships obtain their legit-
imacy and power from the extremely transparent manner in which they operate. That
transparency is a key component of the monitorship's remediation effort, which in-
cludes assuring the public that the organizational misconduct is addressed fully and
completely. Without a large grant of transparency, the monitorship would be unlikely
to achieve one of its goals, which is to improve the monitored organization's rela-
tionships with third parties. There are open questions about the efficacy of trusting
the monitorship to actually function in a highly transparent manner, but this is a sep-
arate question from whether the monitorship should be highly transparent.
2. Low Transparency & High Confidentiality
The appropriate transparency and confidentiality norms for Corporate Compli-
ance Monitorships are different from the other monitorships discussed in this Article.
In previous work, I argued that the relationships amongst the Corporate Compliance
Monitor, the government, and the corporation would benefit from privilege, which
would allow the parties to conduct the monitorship within the confines of binding
confidentiality. 224 As currently structured, Corporate Compliance Monitorships re-
quire cooperation between the monitor and the corporation to develop a set of rec-
ommendations that the monitored organization will adopt to prevent future miscon-
duct. This form of problem solving is becoming necessary in an environment where
internal stakeholders often have superior access to the organizational information
necessary to design the most effective solution to a particular regulatory issue. 225 In
the instance of Corporate Compliance Monitorships, the monitor must garner infor-
mation from members of the monitored organization to develop a set of effective
recommendations. Thus, allowing for certain levels of reliable and binding confiden-
tiality amongst the parties might help achieve greater cooperation between the mon-
itor and monitored organization and, in turn, more effective monitorships. 226
C. Duties
Each monitorship structure involves a slightly different set of actors, albeit ac-
tors in an interconnected set of networks. One of the primary concerns regarding the
use of monitorships is that an entity with no binding, legal duties to any other party,
224. Root, supra note 8, at 550-70.
225. See, e.g., David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, New Governance & Legal Regu-
lation: Complementarity, Rivalry and Transformation, 13 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 539 (2007).
226. A previous article by the author provides a more robust discussion of this issue.
See Root, supra note 8, at 550-70.
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other than courts in some instances, is given huge responsibility for overseeing re-
mediation efforts within firms. 227 This Section will briefly highlight how an analysis
of a monitor's potential fiduciary duties could vary depending upon the monitorship
structure.
1. Traditional, Court-Ordered Monitorships
When a monitor is a court-appointed agent, it is clear that it owes a duty to the
court, because it is the court's express agent.228 The monitor is appointed by the
court, sometimes with party input, to act as an extension of the court and provide a
service for the court. If the monitorship truly is engaged in ensuring pure specific
performance with the court's order, it seems permissible to conclude that the court is
the sole party to whom a Traditional, Court-Ordered Monitor owes a duty.
2. Enforcement Monitorships
Similarly, monitors engaged in simple rote enforcement monitoring on behalf of
the government, as seen in Enforcement Monitorships, appear to owe a duty to the
government and are often perceived as agents of the government. They may, how-
ever, also have a duty-or should have a duty-to outsiders with tangible interests
in the monitorship's ultimate remediation efforts, because the monitorship is under-
taken for their benefit. For example, a lawyer may sometimes owe a duty to a non-
client when the lawyer knows a non-client may rely on the lawyer's work product.
229
An Enforcement Monitor is often aware that the individuals whom the monitored
organization harmed are relying upon the monitor's work to receive appropriate re-
mediation. Thus, in the National Mortgage Settlement monitorship,23 ° it may be that
the monitor should owe duties to the governmental agencies that were able to secure
the agreement with the relevant banks, as well as to the homeowners who were the
victims of improper foreclosure proceedings.
3. Corporate Compliance Monitorships
In contrast, monitors overseeing Corporate Compliance Monitorships may owe
duties to the government and the monitored organization. Both the government and
monitored organization typically take an active role in the selection of the monitor.23 1
These monitors act as agents of the government in overseeing the remediation effort
that the underlying settlement agreement requires, but they also function as agents of
the monitored organization by providing a concrete service to the organization (de-
veloping a set of recommendations for the organization to adopt going forward).2 32
The precise nature and depth of these duties and whether other outsiders, including
227. See Khanna, supra note 21, at 234-36 (providing preliminary discussion of the
duties monitors may owe as a result of the monitorship relationship).
228. Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1161-62 (5th Cir. 1982).
229. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 (2000).
230. See supra Part II.A.
231. See, e.g., Warin, Diamant & Root, supra note 8, at 349-50.
232. See supra Part ll.B.
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shareholders, should be owed a duty by the monitor is an open question in need of
further academic study. 233
4. Modem-Day, Court-Ordered Monitorships
A monitor overseeing a Modem-Day, Court-Ordered Monitorship is technically
an agent of the court and owes a corresponding duty to the court. The Modem-Day,
Court-Ordered Monitorship, however, appears to grant a strong amount of autonomy
to the monitor to make what could be significant corporate governance reforms. 234
The types of decisions that the monitor made in the WorldCom example were nor-
mally made by organizational insiders who had clear duties to shareholders. If courts
utilize court-ordered agents with broad grants of authority to make decisions within
the organization as part of formal remedies to organizational misconduct, there may
need to be a correspondingly robust analysis of who within the organization will be
held responsible for the impact of those decisions on shareholders. If the monitor
undertakes ill-advised actions, it may be appropriate to subject him to some sort of
concrete consequences. Those consequences should likely be established prior to the
monitorship period so that shareholders are aware of their rights under the monitor-
ship ex ante.
5. Public Relations Monitorships
The Public Relations Monitorship presents an interesting conundrum when con-
sidering to whom the monitor would or should owe duties. It may owe a limited duty
to the monitored organization to oversee remediation efforts competently, but given
the great efforts taken to demonstrate the separation between the monitor and the
monitored organization, it may be inappropriate to find that the monitor owes a ro-
bust duty to the organization. The monitorship is generally undertaken for the benefit
of the public and, in some instances, a particular subset of the public, but that could
be a difficult universe to define when attempting to articulate a formal set of duties.
Thus, it may be that a monitor's duties within a Public Relations Monitorship may
vary from one monitorship to another depending upon the parties involved, thereby
making it extremely difficult to make a broad, ex ante pronouncement about the ap-
propriate boundaries for outlining the duties owed by a Public Relations Monitor.
The upshot of the analysis in Part III is that differences amongst monitorships
matter when considering common issues of monitorship reform. The Part demon-
strates that the benefits and detriments associated with court oversight differ with
each identified monitorship type. Court oversight appears to be most important when
an organization appears hostile toward the imposition of a monitorship, thereby mak-
233. Root, supra note 8, at 556-57; see also Khanna, supra note 21, at 234-236 (dis-
cussing rationales, briefly, under which monitors could be considered fiduciaries to shareholders).
234. See supra Part II. C.
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ing the court's involvement a valuable incentive (or big stick) to encourage cooper-
ation. But when the organization has entered the monitorship on a voluntary basis,
the rationale for robust court supervision diminishes. In contrast, the majority of
monitorships identified in this Article would seem to benefit from high levels of
transparency and low levels of confidentiality. High levels of confidentiality appear
to be important only when the monitorship requires a great deal of cooperation and
organizational buy-in from the monitored firm. Finally, it appears that the different
structure of monitorships results in a unique principal/agent construct for each mon-
itorship type. The implication of this conclusion is that it would seem to be difficult
to make a sweeping pronouncement regarding the appropriate fiduciary duties for all
monitors.235 The analysis provided in Part III is preliminary and additional study
would likely be beneficial, but at a minimum it raises concerns about attempting to
treat all monitorships in the same manner. In short, differences matter when evaluat-
ing monitorships, and these differences must be taken into account when considering
methods of analyzing, reforming, or regulating monitorships.
IV. Additional Considerations
The above analyses establish that monitorships take different forms depending
upon the type of remediation effort undertaken and that these differences are critical
in assessing the advisability of commonly suggested monitorship reforms. This Ar-
ticle's findings present a number of additional considerations that lawmakers, schol-
ars, and the public should contemplate. This Part addresses five such concerns. First,
it discusses how modern-day monitorships are related to past efforts to achieve struc-
tural reform litigation. Second, it distinguishes modern-day monitorships from com-
pliance actors designated as "internal monitors" and situates modern-day monitors
within the larger world of compliance actors focused on remediation efforts. Third,
it argues in favor of more targeted monitorship reform efforts. Fourth, it explains
how this Article's framework could assist in efforts to assess the effectiveness of
monitorships. Fifth, it demonstrates how this Article's findings could lead to im-
proved monitor-selection processes.
A. Role of Structural Reform Litigation
One question raised by this Article is whether modern-day monitorships are gen-
uinely distinct from court-appointed agents utilized in the structural reform litigation
of yesteryear. Traditionally, structural reform litigation was used as part of remedia-
tion efforts aimed at issues like desegregation and prison reform.236 It was conceived
as a new "public law model" meant to "adjust future behavior" and "not to compen-
sate for past wrong." '237 It "provide[d] for a complex, on-going regime of perfor-
mance rather than a simple, one-shot, one-way transfer," which was more common
235. Khanna,supra note 21, at 233-34 (discussing briefly the issue of a monitor's duties
and the lack of guidance on the issue).
236. John C. Jeffries, Jr. & George A. Rutherglen, Structural Reform Revisited, 95
CALIF. L. REV. 1387, 1409-10 (2007).
237. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1298 (1976).
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in traditional litigation models. 238 Specifically, the parties to the litigation entered
into a negotiation process to develop an order that could be entered by the court and
in some circumstances the judge would rely on third-party agents, like "masters,
amici, experts, panels, [or] advisory committees" for information and evaluation of
proposals for relief. ' 239 These agents sometimes found "themselves exercising me-
diating and adjudicatory functions among the parties" and in some circumstances
"put forward their own suggestions."240 In short, the remediation efforts imposed as
part of structural reform litigation could be quite broad and took a variety of forms
depending upon the issues presented in the underlying litigation, just as the modem-
day monitorships of today.
Many scholars would agree that modem-day monitorships are inextricably re-
lated to structural reform litigation efforts. 24 ' Yet there do appear to be some distin-
guishing features between the two related, yet distinct, phenomena. First, structural
reform litigation was typically used by "federal courts ordering comprehensive
changes in state and local institutions." 24 2 Second, it was most often used to remedi-
ate violations of "soundly established constitutional rights." 24 3 Third, because it nec-
essarily arose out of ajudicial decree, court involvement was a necessary component
of the model, even while recognizing that the parties involved in the underlying liti-
gation were allocated "a good deal of party control" as a result of their participation
in negotiations leading to the judicial order. 244
It is not the aim of this Article to suggest that there is no connection between
structural reform litigation and modem-day monitorships. The connection is uncon-
troversial, and the evolution of modem-day monitorships can be traced to court-ap-
pointed agents like those utilized in structural reform litigation. It is, however, the
goal of this Article to concretely demonstrate how monitorships are utilized today,
which includes much higher instances of reliance on independent, third-parties to
oversee remediation efforts in both private and public contexts (often when no con-
stitutional concerns are raised). As a result, modem-day monitorships present new
questions and areas of concern for scholars and lawmakers to consider and address.
This Article seeks merely to frame these issues in a manner that makes these chal-
lenges more apparent.
B. Understanding Internal Monitors
It is relatively common for settlement agreements to include a provision requir-
ing the appointment of an individual internal to the organization to maintain respon-
sibility and oversight of the firm's remediation efforts. For example, in 2013, Ruby
Tuesday, Inc. ("Ruby Tuesday") settled a class age discrimination lawsuit filed by
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1298-1301.
240. Id. at 1301.
241. See, e.g., GARRETr, supra note 21, at 176-77 (discussing the role of structural re-
form litigation in corporate prosecutions).
242. Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 236, at 1387.
243. Id. (quoting Paul J. Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35 W. & L. L.
REV. 949 (1978)).
244. Chayes, supra note 237, at 1299.
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the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. In the settlement agreement,
Ruby Tuesday agreed to "designate a Decree Compliance Monitor ('DCM'), who
shall be an officer or high-level management official of [Ruby Tuesday] who shall
possess the knowledge, capability, organizational authority, and resources to monitor
and ensure [Ruby Tuesday's] compliance with the terms" of the agreement. 45 Indi-
viduals like the Ruby Tuesday DCM look quite similar to the monitors identified in
this Article, 246 because they are (i) employed after a firm has been found to have
engaged in wrongdoing (ii) to effectuate remediation of the organization's miscon-
duct. They are, however, distinct, because they are direct employees of the firm.
A key component of the modern-day monitorships outlined in Parts II and III is
that the monitor retains independence from the monitored organization. This inde-
pendence allows courts, the government, and the public to be less concerned about
the institution's capture of the monitor, which makes the monitor's findings more
credible. Empirical research supports this intuitive notion. For example, a study of
accountants has demonstrated that the entity an accountant works for has a significant
impact on the accountant's findings.247 In one study, "139 professional auditors em-
ployed full-time by one of the Big Four accounting firms in the United States" were
given auditing problems to assess.24 8 "Half of the participants' materials told them
that they had been hired as the external auditor for the firm in question." The other
half were told "that they were working for an outside investor considering investing
money in the firm." 24 9 The study hypothesized, and proved, that "participants would
be more likely to conclude that the accounting behind a firm's financial reports com-
plied with [Generally Accepted Accounting Principles] if they were working for the
firm rather than for an outside investor."25 This study confirmed opinions that others
had expressed. Specifically, that "[i]ndependence is necessary to prevent auditors
from biasing their opinions in favor of their clients." 251 Monitors are distinct from
financial auditors, but the insights of this study demonstrate the importance of main-
taining a strong level of independence when attempting to evaluate an institution's
compliance with legal and regulatory requirements.
That leaves, however, questions regarding the role the actor in the Ruby Tuesday
example, and others similarly situated, serves within compliance efforts. The lack of
scholarship clearly defining what sort of conduct monitors are engaged in, paired
with the importance of the concept of "monitoring" in corporate governance schol-
arship, has resulted in instances of confusion and a lack of precision when referring
245. Consent Decree, EEOC v. Ruby Tuesday, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-01330-MRH, slip op.
at 7 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 2013).
246. Because the term "monitor" is already used in legal scholarship for the compliance
actors this Article is discussing, this Article continues with this trend. Attempting to argue that others use
a new name for this type of independent, private outsider would likely not be a particularly fruitful dis-
cussion.
247. See Don A. Moore, Lloyd Tanlu & Max H. Bazerman, Conflicts of Interest and
the Intrusion of Bias, 5 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 37 (2010).
248. Id. at 39.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Max H. Bazerman & Don Moore, Is It Time for Auditor Independence Yet?, 36
AccT. ORGS. & SOC'Y 310, 310 (2011) (citing M.W. Nelson, Ameliorating Conflicts of Interest in A udit-
ing: Effects of Recent Reforms on Auditors and Their Clients, 31 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 1 (2006)).
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to different compliance actors. The complexity of compliance efforts at organizations
is quite vast, and a variety of actors assist in these efforts. Because corporate com-
pliance literature is still in a relatively early stage, legal scholarship has not yet ade-
quately addressed many of these intricacies.
252
One such intricacy heretofore unidentified in legal scholarship is that there ap-
pear to be three primary stages of compliance efforts: (i) gatekeepers are charged
with preventing and detecting misconduct, (ii) investigators are charged with inves-
tigating misconduct once it is discovered, and (iii) a third category of actors, currently
unnamed within legal scholarship, are charged with overseeing efforts' to remediate
the harms that gatekeepers detected and that investigators investigated. One might
refer to this last category as remediators. Remediators, like gatekeepers, can be ex-
ternal to a firm, but there are also internal remediators. Modern-day monitorships fit
within this third category and are external remediators; the internal compliance actor
used in the Ruby Tuesday case appears to be an internal remediator. Their roles are
similar but distinct.
C. More-Targeted Reform Efforts
Attempts to reform monitorships may benefit from a more targeted approach
than what has typically been suggested. This type of segmented regulatory reform is
utilized in many different contexts. For example, there are special regulatory require-
ments for subsets of gatekeepers. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act provides an organiza-
tion's independent audit committee primary control over decisions regarding auditor
compensation.2 53 Auditors are traditional gatekeepers, but this regulatory require-
ment is not applied universally to all forms of gatekeepers. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
also required the SEC to adopt regulations that would obligate attorneys practicing
before the SEC to "go up the corporate ladder and report evidence of fraud."
254
Again, the lawyers whom the SEC's regulations target are gatekeepers, but this re-
quirement is limited to lawyers and not universally extended to other gatekeepers.
Thus, in the same statute, which was enacted to help curb organizational misconduct,
Congress saw fit to pass targeted reforms for particular subsets of gatekeepers. As a
general matter, policymakers and scholars are quite good at parsing the differences
amongst different actors and developing rules and standards that are best suited to
252. See Geoffrey P. Miller, The Compliance Function: An Overview I n.2 (N.Y.C. Ctr.
For Law, Econ. & Org., Working Paper No. 14-36, 2014) ("Legal scholarship on the law of compliance
is as yet underdeveloped.").
253. COFFEE, supra note 60, at 170.
254. Susan P. Koniak, The Bar's Struggle with the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1236,
1270 (2003) (citing Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002 § 307, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245 (West Supp. 2003)). In-house
attorneys are required to report misconduct up the chain within their organization, but if the organization
fails to remedy the misconduct, the in-house attorney typically is required to maintain the privilege and
withdraw from the representation. An accountant who found a similar point of wrongdoing would not
have a similar restriction. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.13(b) (2013); see also Steven Da-
vidoff Solomon, Keeping Corporate Lawyers Silent Can Shelter Wrongdoing, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK
(Aug. 26, 2014, 6:28 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/08/26/keeping-corporate-lawyers-silent-
can-shelter-wrongdoing (discussing an in-house attorney at Walmart who resigned after attempts to in-
vestigate potential FCPA misconduct were stifled by her superiors and who is now restricted from dis-
cussing the events due to Walmart's assertion of the attomey-client privilege).
Vol. 33, 2016
Modem-Day Monitorships
achieve improved regulatory and legal compliance. Monitorships should likely be
treated in a similar manner.
When evaluating monitorship reform, policymakers and scholars should first
identify the particular monitorship subset that is of interest to them. This identifica-
tion will allow them to better consider the ramifications of proposed reforms. For
example, if one assumed all monitorships could be universally regulated, one might
conclude that all monitorships should be (i) granted low levels of confidentiality and
(ii) required to adopt high levels of transparency. The monitorships identified in this
Article overwhelmingly look as if they would benefit from that type of confidential-
ity/transparency model.255 Yet, when one breaks down monitorships based on the
type of remediation effort being overseen, it looks as if Corporate Compliance Mon-
itorships could be stymied by high levels of transparency because the corporation
may not cooperate as expansively as it would in an environment with high levels of
confidentiality and low levels of transparency.1 6 Thus, a policymaker may want to
create a default rule requiring high levels of transparency for monitorships generally
with an exception for Corporate Compliance Monitorships specifically.
One potential drawback to this type of segmented regulatory approach, of
course, is that it might take more time and be more costly to implement. 5 7 It is more
difficult to ascertain the differences between categories of monitorships than the dif-
ferences between auditors and lawyers. Additionally, because there are many differ-
ent types of monitorships, it could be quite difficult to engage in a broad-based reg-
ulatory reform effort that effectively addresses the concerns that all monitorship
types present. These legitimate concerns, however, may suggest that monitorships
should be regulated on a more localized level.
For example, instead of attempting to pass a broad statute governing all moni-
torships, which was proposed in the House of Representatives in 2008 and 2009,258
it may be preferable to delegate authority to administrative agencies to adopt the
types of reforms that make the most sense to them based on the type of remediation
efforts they ask monitors to oversee. If agencies like the FTC and SEC were required
to engage in a standard notice and comment regulatory process 25 9 in adopting their
particular set of standards, it might assuage some concerns regarding regulator cap-
ture and appease those who are skeptical of the government's neutrality in the face
of organizational wrongdoing. Because the vast majority of monitorships are im-
posed with the involvement of a governmental actor, this approach-requiring indi-
vidual agencies to adopt formal standards, through notice-and-comment rulemaking,
255. See supra Part III.B.
256. See supra Part II.B.2.
257. In part, this is a classic rules versus standards conundrum. Louis Kaplow, Rules
Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 561 (1992). A general rule provides a legal
command that can resolve issues in advance; thus a rule regarding confidentiality, for example, for all
monitorships would leave less ambiguity but also less flexibility. Id. at 562. A standard, however, regard-
ing confidentiality would allow enforcement authorities to take into account monitorship types prior to
making a binding determination regarding appropriate confidentiality norms in a particular situation. Id.
258. See Khanna, supra note 21 (discussing proposed legislation in the House of Rep-
resentatives).
259. Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L REV. 465, 472-90
(2013) (explaining notice and comment requirements generally).
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that will govern their use of monitorships--could effectuate meaningful reform ef-
forts on a targeted basis.
260
D. Improved Assessment Ability
This Article's categorization of monitorships might improve the ability of poli-
cymakers and scholars to assess monitorships.
First, the categorization allows for easy identification of monitorships, because
each monitorship type has certain common characteristics. Specifically, the Article's
analysis demonstrates that a monitorship can be identified when (i) an independent,
private outsider is retained by a firm, (ii) after the discovery of organizational mis-
conduct, (iii) to oversee the firm's remediation efforts, and (iv) provide information
to third parties about the efficacy of the firm's efforts. As is demonstrated in Part II,
monitorships are used in a variety of contexts and are often not referred to as moni-
torships, which may make it difficult to draft a statute or adopt a bright-line rule
regulating monitorships. 261 Yet, by focusing on the function monitors provide and
the timing of their retention, it becomes easier to identify monitorships across a va-
riety of contexts. This identification is important, because it will allow researchers to
better understand the scope and breadth of monitorships when engaging in evaluative
efforts. Additionally, this identification mechanism makes pinpointing changes in
the use of monitorships, like in the case of the Public Relations Monitorship, more
readily apparent.
Second, understanding that monitorships can be grouped based on the type of
remediation effort the monitorship is meant to achieve may make it easier to engage
in studies comparing the effectiveness of monitorships within and across categories
of monitorships. Studies evaluating the effectiveness of Enforcement Monitorships
versus Corporate Compliance Monitorships may provide valuable insight into the
manner in which greater legal and regulatory compliance is obtained within organi-
zations generally. Additionally, researchers may be able to identify industries or
types of harm that are well-suited for remediation through a particular type of moni-
torship. The research possibilities are numerous, but understanding the nuances
within monitorships may result in more productive and fruitful assessments.
That is not, however, to suggest that the categorization in this Article is the only
means by which monitorships could be grouped. There could be many different ways
in which someone could decide to focus in on a subset for monitorships. For example,
it may be completely sensible to limit one's research to the universe of monitorships
that arise out of DPAs or NPAs1 62 There could be sound rationales for believing that
260. This type of solution would not, of course, assist in regulating the use of Public
Relations Monitorships, because a governmental entity is not involved in that monitorship process. That
point conceded, focusing on reform efforts that could effectively target subsets of monitorships would
seem preferable to adopting ineffectual, broad-based reforms that fail to capture the nuances associated
with different categories of monitorships.
261. See, e.g., 2010 Intel, supra note 72 (requiring the retention ofaTechnical Consult-
ant).
262. Many analyses of monitorships are done so within the context of discussions about
DPAs and NPAs more broadly. See, e.g., GARRETT, supra note 21, at 172-95 (analyzing monitorships that
arise out of DPAs and NPAs). Monitorships arising out of DPAs/NPAs are, however, just a subset of the
larger phenomenon.
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monitorships arising out of DPAs or NPAs are special in some way and should be
treated alike in terms of structure and regulatory requirements. This Article is not
unequivocally arguing in favor of adopting the particular categorization provided in
Part II. Instead, the Article is arguing that monitorships take a variety of forms and
attempts to regulate all monitorships wholesale are likely misguided. Scholars and
policymakers who take this insight into account and who are explicit in identifying
the type of monitorships they are researching and addressing will, it is hoped, develop
more precise and effective monitorship reform efforts.
E. Improved Criteria for Monitor Selection
This Article's findings regarding the underlying differences among monitor-
ships might be helpful in efforts aimed at improving monitor-selection processes.
Scholars,263 policymakers, 264 reporters,265 and courts266 have lamented the processes
by which monitors are selected. Receiving an appointment as a monitor has the po-
tential to be a very lucrative assignment, yet there is no standard selection process.267
And, as established in Part II, monitors can wield an impressive amount of authority
over organizations. Thus, issues surrounding monitorship selection have been ripe
for criticism.
The selection of monitors, however, may not need to be overly complicated or
necessitate congressional action mandating "that monitors be selected from a public
national pool of prequalified candidates." 268 Instead, the selection of a monitor could
be tied to the monitor's perceived ability to effectively oversee the particular reme-
diation effort being undertaken at or for the monitored firm. The applicable remedi-
ation effort is determined prior to the retention of a monitor, so interested parties
should be able to identify important characteristics for the monitor to have prior to
selecting a monitor.
For example, if the monitorship involves rote compliance enforcement, it might
make sense to appoint a monitor who has past experience reviewing and assessing
an organization's compliance with legal requirements. Research to date has found
that over half of monitors appointed as the result of DPAs or NPAs were former
prosecutors.269 This statistic easily garners criticism related to potential cronyism
concerns (prosecutors are picking their friends to be monitors), as well as expertise
concerns (former prosecutors may lack sufficient corporate governance expertise to
serve as monitors).270 Yet it might be entirely appropriate to pick former prosecutors
263. See, e.g., GARRETT, supra note 21, at 178-79; Khanna, supra note 21, at 234, 241.
264. See, e.g., Khanna, supra note 21, at 238-40 (discussing a monitor selection process
included in proposed legislation in the House of Representatives as well as internal DOJ guidance to
prosecutors regarding the selection of monitors).
265. See, e.g., Shenon, supra note 19 (discussing concerns of cronyism in the selection
of Ashcroft to serve as a monitor).
266. Henning, supra note 190.
267. GARRETT, supra note 21, at 178.
268. Khanna, supra note 21, at 238 (discussing one of the provisions of the proposed
legislation in the House of Representatives aimed at regulating monitorships).
269. GARRETT, supra note 21, at 178.
270. See id at 178-79; Cunningham, supra note 112, at 44-47.
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or government attorneys to serve as monitors for Enforcement Monitorships. A mon-
itor with prior prosecutorial experience may be particularly well-suited for gauging
an organization's progress in fulfilling specified requirements.
In contrast, the selection of a Corporate Compliance Monitor might benefit from
an attempt to identify an individual with robust experience developing corporate
compliance programs or with expertise in corporate governance and the area of law
that the monitored organization violated. These types of experiences are analogous
to the type of work the monitor will be asked to engage in during the Corporate
Compliance Monitorship. Thus, if high numbers of former prosecutors without cor-
porate compliance or governance expertise are charged with overseeing Corporate
Compliance Monitorships, it may raise a valid concern that warrants critical inquiry.
This insight about monitorship selection may seem intuitive, but the Apple mon-
itorship suggests that it may not be. The Apple monitorship was a Modem-Day,
Court-Ordered Monitorship. Thus, its stated monitoring scope looked narrow, but in
practice the scope became quite broad and appeared to attempt to grant the monitor
authority to engage in activities more commonly associated with a Corporate Com-
pliance Monitorship. 27
1
The individual appointed as Apple's External Compliance Monitor has signifi-
cant public and private legal expertise and heads a consulting firm that offers "mon-
itoring, crisis management, strategic advisory, and public affairs services." The
firm's website states:
We have oversight and monitoring experience second to none. In addition to [the External Com-
pliance Monitor's] five years serving as the Inspector General of the Department of Justice, our
oversight experience includes current assignments monitoring two of the largest and best-known
companies in the world, [including Apple]. In addition, [the External Compliance Monitor] has
served as counsel to entities subject to monitorships, providing guidance on how to establish
relationships with the monitor most conducive to an effective and conflict-free relationship.
2 72
This statement raises a few potential concerns. First, a decision was made to highlight
the monitor's extensive governmental bona fides, suggesting that this experience will
be an asset when engaging in monitoring activities. Statements of this nature could
reinforce the perception that a monitor is an agent of the government, which, as ex-
plained in Part II, could result in difficulties during a Modern-Day, Court-Ordered
Monitorship where the monitor is doing more than monitoring compliance with a
specific court order. Second, the statement acknowledges that monitorship relation-
ships are often associated with conflict. There is, however, evidence that the moni-
tor's tone when communicating with Apple may have exacerbated potential conflicts
between himself and the company. For example, in response to Apple's concerns
regarding the costs of monitorship, the monitor explained that Apple "misconceived
[the monitor's letter]. It was not to begin a negotiation about fees, rates, and ex-
271. See supra Part II.C.
272. Monitoring, BROMWICH GROUP, http://www.bromwichgroup.com/services/moni-
toring (last visited Feb. 28, 2015).
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penses, nor was it meant to provide [Apple] with an opportunity to provide [the mon-
itor] with guidelines." '273 This aggressive stance is likely appropriate to take in Court-
Ordered Monitorships, where the monitor is the agent of the court. In Apple's case,
the responsibility for negotiating the monitor's fee was explicitly delegated to the
government. 274 Nevertheless, one could understand how a company on the receiving
end of that type of statement might be wary of entering into a cooperative, working
relationship with the monitor. 275 Indeed, statements of this nature might serve to en-
trench a view on the part of the monitored organization that the monitor is an agent
of the government and not an independent actor. Third, there is nothing in the state-
ment, or in the monitoring portion of the monitor's website,276 that suggests the mon-
itor has experience architecting corporate compliance programs or expertise in cor-
porate governance within the confines of a monitorship relationship.277 One previous
monitorship assignment undertaken by Apple's External Compliance Monitor
(which is not mentioned in the above statement) was as the Enforcement Monitor for
the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department ("MPD"), where the mon-
itor was tasked with ensuring the MPD's implementation of the specific reforms con-
tained in a memorandum of understanding between the MPD and the DOJ.
27 8
Based on the information available on the monitor's website, the individual se-
lected as Apple's External Compliance Monitor likely would have been an excellent
pick if the Apple Monitorship had taken a form similar to Traditional, Court-Ordered
Monitorships. It cannot be disputed that the monitor has significant experience as-
sessing an organization's compliance with specific requirements. Yet the court and
monitor appeared to initially conceive of the monitor's role more broadly, despite
273. Christopher M. Matthews, Apple Feud Deepens with Court-Appointed Monitor,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 30, 2013),
http://www.wsj.com/artcles/SB 10001424052702304361604579291042388608328.
274. See Apple Monitorship Court Order, supra note 141, at 14.
275. Matthews, supra note 273. Companies retaining a Corporate Compliance Moni-
torship typically have input in the monitor's selection process, which does give them an opportunity to
negotiate items like rates and expenses. See, e.g., Warin, Diamant & Root, supra note 8, at 372.
276. A lack of information on the website does not necessarily prove an absence of
this type of experience on the part of the monitor. It does, however, demonstrate the experiences that
were deemed important to include on the website.
277. I am taking a rather nuanced and narrow view when I refer to expertise developing
corporate compliance programs or corporate governance reforms. As Professor Miriam Baer has recently
explained, much of the work that compliance professionals engage in falls into two categories: "the cor-
porate policing approach that is familiar to many, and a structural approach one might call 'corporate
architecture."' Miriam Baer, Confronting the Two Faces of Corporate Fraud, 66 FLA. L. REV. 87, 93
(2014). The policing function is what monitors within Traditional, Court-Ordered Monitorships and En-
forcement Monitorships are generally asked to provide, and a career as a prosecutor or regulator likely
makes one particularly well suited to oversee such policing efforts. The Corporate Compliance Monitor-
ship and the Modem-Day, Court-Ordered Monitorship, however, also require the monitor to provide guid-
ance on corporate architecture, and I do not assume that individuals with significant practice experience,
even significant practice experience overseeing activities like internal investigations, necessarily have the
corporate governance expertise necessary to assist a firm in its efforts to improve its corporate architecture.
Thus, the same concerns that one may have about whether prosecutors have sufficient expertise to oversee
corporate governance reforms and dictate specific compliance programs could also exist for individuals
with significant practice experience.
278. Michael R. Bromwich, Final Report of the Independent Monitorfor the Metropol-
itan Police Department, OFF. INDEP. MONITOR FOR METROPOLITAN DISTRICT COLUMBIA POLICE DEP'T
(June 13, 2008), http://www.policemonitor.org./MPD/reports/080613reportv2.pdf
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the fact that the monitor lacked significant antitrust expertise. 279 Indeed, the monitor
hired an antitrust assistant to aid him in the matter.280 It appears that the court did not
foresee why this might cause problems during the monitorship term. 281 This lack of
understanding may be related to improper initial consideration by the court and the
government about the type of background a monitor would need to effectively assist
a corporation with improving its internal antitrust compliance program.
282
Thus, this Article's analysis suggests that parties involved in a monitor-selection
effort-whether a court, prosecutor, or private firm-should engage in a robust as-
sessment of what types of remediation efforts the monitor is going to be responsible
for overseeing. Using those efforts as a baseline, the parties should identify a list of
important experiences and qualifications. Once that list is created, potential monitors
should be identified. It appears that, all too often, parties select monitors who are
well-known in certain circles or who have conducted previous monitorships without
assessing whether the well-connected individual with previous monitorship experi-
ence is well-suited for the particular monitorship at issue. It is no wonder that such a
lackluster selection process has been fraught with turmoil and scandal.
A variety of considerations flow from the findings presented in this Article. This
Part highlights five, but many other concerns remain, including: (i) matters related
to the high costs of monitorships, (ii) the government's potential overuse or misuse
of monitorships, and (iii) the incentives that the use of career monitors may create
for the independent, private outsiders engaged as monitors. The Article's framework,
however, provides a valuable tool for assessing these issues in a more robust manner.
279. United States v. Apple, 787 F.3d 131, 136 (2d Cir. 2015) (explaining that Brom-
wich's team included an antitrust lawyer who supplied "an expertise" Bromwich "lacked"); see also Edi-
torial, All Along the Apple Watchtower, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 17, 2015) (explaining that Bromwich "had no
prior antitrust experience but does have the dubious honor of being the first and only involuntary monitor
ever in civil antitrust litigation"), http://www.wsj.com/articles/all-along-the-apple-watchtower-
1424132878.
280. Anti-trust Monitor Bromwich Reiterates Claims in Rebuttal, ELECTRONISTA (Dec.
31, 2013, 2:00 AM), http://www.electronista.com/articles/13/12/31/cites.previous.experi-
ence.but.had.to.hire.anti.trust.assistant ("Apple pointed out that Bromwich required a second lawyer with
actual experience in antitrust issues to assist him. Bromwich demanded a $1,100 per hour rate, as well as
a 15 percent 'administrative fee' to his consulting firm--on top of the $1,025 per hour for the antitrust
lawyer assistant. Though the hourly rate is typical for top-flight lawyers, both the 'administrative fee' and
his need for an assistant is [sic] unusual. For his first two weeks on the case, Bromwich billed Apple over
$138,000.").
281. It is not clear whether formal legal mechanisms could avoid this problem in the
future. In part, the goal of this Article is to bring more awareness of different monitorship types in an
effort to encourage lawmakers and policymakers to think through the remediation effort the monitorship
is meant to achieve and to consider what qualities a monitor would need to ensure the remediation effort
is successful.
282. United States v. Apple, 787 F.3d 131, 135 n.1 (2d Cir. 2015) (explaining that
"Bromwich's past monitorships arose out of voluntary resolutions of litigation" and that "Bromwich has
adapted to the distinct posture of the monitorship" and was "desisting" from certain activities that were
not appropriate within the context of this type of monitorship).
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Conclusion
Monitorships have become a diffuse and diverse tool for effectuating remedia-
tion efforts at firms that have engaged in misconduct. As demonstrated in this Article,
their use can be found in a myriad of contexts, and a great deal of responsibility has
been outsourced to monitorships from courts, the government, and organizations.
This Article makes three new contributions to legal scholarship. First, it estab-
lishes that modem-day monitorships take a variety of forms that are dependent upon
the remediation function the monitor is charged with overseeing. Second, it demon-
strates that monitorships are currently evolving and that two recent evolutions-
courts' use of expansive monitorships and the privatization of monitorships-should
be of particular concern to policymakers and scholars. Third, it makes clear that dif-
ferences amongst monitorships matter when assessing the efficacy of reform efforts
aimed at regulating monitorships. The failure to identify this fact may have contrib-
uted to unsuccessful reform efforts.
Modern-Day Monitorships are an important tool within compliance and reme-
diation efforts at organizations that have failed to adhere to legal and regulatory re-
quirements. This Article's contributions can be utilized by scholars and lawmakers
studying and addressing the unique circumstances created by monitorships. Obtain-
ing a greater understanding of their use and potential impact will assist in efforts
aimed at achieving greater compliance and improved ethicality within firms.

